Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan has yet to grasp the thread that would enable him to maintain the old regional order. Iran is no longer the same following the blows it and its proxies received before October 7, 2023. The war that has dismantled the external borders of the Iranian regime in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria now threatens to dismantle Iran’s internal ones, as suggested by Benjamin Netanyahu’s evolving strategy aimed at significantly limiting Iran\u2019s role and eradicating its nuclear ambitions. This conflict is not merely about borders or the cleansing of adjacent territories; rather, it represents a major transformative war seeking to establish a new regional order, one that places Iran \u2014 and to a lesser extent Turkey \u2014 on the periphery, stripped of militias and diminished in influence.<\/p>\n
Hamas has long served as a focal point of this old regional order. Erdo\u011fan\u2019s outbursts, especially when he compared Netanyahu to Hitler and characterized Israeli policies as “Nazi,” have neither saved the movement from decline nor alleviated Erdo\u011fan\u2019s apparent misunderstanding of the sensitivities surrounding the Holocaust and such comparisons. These statements were not simply expressions of anger or showcases of Erdo\u011fan’s usual rhetorical flair; instead, they aimed at two main objectives: persuading conservative Turks and Islamist factions of his resolute support for Gazans through his staunch defense of Hamas, and seeking to inherit Iran’s influence in Gaza by positioning himself as a mediator in the ceasefire and reconciliation efforts between Hamas and Israel.<\/p>\n
Erdo\u011fan understands that the war\u2019s goal is not, as he has recently suggested, to reach the heart of Anatolia. Instead, it aims to eliminate Iran\u2019s regional role, and the end of that role signifies the dismantling of the old order both Tehran and Ankara once dominated. It is essential to grasp Turkey\u2019s anxiety over the potential transformation of the entire region stemming from the likelihood of Iran fracturing if subjected to decisive and destructive external attacks, which would diminish its roles and presence as the last country in NATO’s sphere bordering both Iran and Russia, thereby benefiting from Western contradictions towards these nations. Most crucially for Turkey is ensuring Iranian Kurds do not replicate the successes of the Kurds in Iraq and Syria.<\/p>\n
Concerning Turkey\u2019s internal confusion, there are reflections on the potential for an external strike against the Iranian regime that could devastate its internal security and military capabilities, possibly leading to a wave of internal autonomy movements.<\/p>\n
In this atmosphere, Turkey seems poised to reassess three historical phases that contributed to the emergence of a Kurdish entity along its borders. In 1991, late Turkish President Turgut \u00d6zal appealed to his Western allies to facilitate the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurdish refugees, emphasizing that his country could not accommodate “one million destitute.” This repatriation desire contributed to the establishment of a no-fly zone in Iraqi Kurdistan, allowing for refugee shelter in line with UN Security Council Resolution 688.<\/p>\n
A second perceived \u201cmistake\u201d by Turkey occurred a year after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rose to power. At that time, Turkey declined to engage in efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein\u2019s regime, sparing Iraqi Kurds from the intensity of potential Turkish interventions that could have hindered their autonomy aspirations. Moreover, Ankara\u2019s withdrawal elevated Iraqi Kurdish forces to the status of direct allies of the U.S. during the 2003 overthrow of Saddam’s regime.<\/p>\n
The U.S. intervention in Syria and its support for the People\u2019s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women\u2019s Protection Units (YPJ) in the fight against ISIS during the 2014 Kobane campaign illustrated Turkey\u2019s categorical refusal to combat ISIS while simultaneously supporting it and ignoring its movements. This laid the groundwork for an alliance between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the international coalition against ISIS.<\/p>\n
Reflecting on such \u201cmistakes\u201d raises a series of complex questions for Turkey: What if the war reaches Iran and the Kurds achieve rights similar to those gained in Iraq and Syria? How will Ankara address scenarios such as the fall of the Iranian regime? Will it repeat the \u201cerrors\u201d of Iraq and Syria by opposing the war and distancing itself from its repercussions? Will Turkey seek to renew its peace approach with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in light of the achievements of the Kurds in Iraq and Syria?<\/p>\n
Theoretically, the Turkish government lacks a coherent viewpoint on the region\u2019s outcomes. Could Ankara preempt significant regional shifts by addressing its internal issues, thereby paving the way for improved relations with its neighbors instead of exacerbating tensions? The root of Turkey\u2019s problems with its neighbors is internal and manifests externally. This line of thought leads us to question the potential for reviving the Kurdish-Turkish peace process and whether it will once again attempt this after experimenting with violent, nihilistic solutions and establishing security zones in northern Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan.<\/p>\n
In light of the events concerning Iran and Israel, Turkish President Devlet Bah\u00e7eli recently extended a handshake to Abdullah \u00d6calan through Tuncer Bak\u0131rhan, the co-chairman of the Peoples\u2019 Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), at the inaugural session of the new legislative term in the Turkish parliament. Before this handshake, Bah\u00e7eli regarded the DEM as representative of “terrorism” and “separatism,” equating it with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party). His handshake and cryptic references to “peace” may hint at the possibility of a renewed peace process. Correspondingly, Bak\u0131rhan and imprisoned Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirta\u015f underscored the need to engage with \u00d6calan, indicating that the state\u2019s focus should remain on Imrali and that there should not be multiple negotiation centers for the Kurdish question.<\/p>\n
However, this context adds to the ambiguity surrounding Erdo\u011fan and Bah\u00e7eli\u2019s thoughts. The prospect of war still looms large. Why else would Turkey mobilize and build up its forces in Iraqi Kurdistan? Why do its drones persist in strikes in northeastern Syria? Why has there been no suggestion of changing its policies in the occupied Syrian territories? Turkey currently wades through a delicate balance of desiring peace while confronting the urgency of conflict. All these developments occur against the backdrop of future changes in Iran and Turkey\u2019s need to adapt to a new reality in which Iranian Kurds, and to some degree the Free Life Party (PJAK), could play a significant role in the future of Kurds in Iran and the wider region.<\/p>\n
Such considerations may leave Turkey with two main options: either escalating the cycle of violence and warfare to its eastern frontiers or finding new ways to engage with an evolving Kurdish reality without resorting to violence or military solutions.<\/p>\n
The resolution to these pressing dilemmas may ultimately hinge on the state of Kurdish-Turkish peace and its impacts on the broader Kurdish landscape that surrounds Turkey to the south.<\/p>\n
Without addressing these issues, Turkey will remain on the fault line, especially if profound changes occur in the situation in Iran.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan has yet to grasp the thread that would enable him to maintain the old regional order. Iran is no longer the same following the blows it and its proxies received before October 7, 2023. The war that has dismantled the external borders of the Iranian regime in Gaza, Lebanon, and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":266,"featured_media":5664,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[963,51,37,57,974,725,36],"ppma_author":[506],"class_list":["post-5663","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-7-october","tag-akp","tag-erdogan","tag-iran","tag-netanyahu","tag-sdf","tag-turkey"],"authors":[{"term_id":506,"user_id":266,"is_guest":0,"slug":"shoresh-darwish","display_name":"Shoresh Darwish","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/Shoresh-3.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/Shoresh-3.jpg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5663","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/266"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5663"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5663\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5678,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5663\/revisions\/5678"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5664"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5663"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5663"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5663"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=5663"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}