Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has a tried-and-true strategy for dealing with the Turks regarding the Syrian file. It is enough for him to trigger Turkey’s pathological fears regarding the Kurds and declare the dangers of the secession of the Autonomous Administration and the creation of a Kurdish entity, which causes Ankara to flinch and rush to engage in discussions with Moscow in search of a solution to this ongoing nightmare. Perhaps the Russian approach, centered on the need for a reconciliation between Bashar al-Assad and Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan, emerges against the backdrop of this tactic that Russia skillfully amplifies and utilizes.<\/p>\n
The foreign minister has long drawn on a vocabulary that suggests a Kurdish desire to \u2018secede from Syria\u2019 and establish a \u2018state\u2019 or \u2018semi-state.\u2019 In his latest statement earlier this month, Lavrov reiterated his country’s allegations that Washington is seeking to establish a \u2018semi-state entity\u2019. He also claimed in January 2023 that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were \u2018leading a separatist project\u2019, having issued similar warnings a year prior.<\/p>\n
All this comes despite Lavrov’s awareness that the Syrian Kurds are not seeking secession and that the Autonomous Administration has already requested the Russian Foreign Ministry to advocate for a political solution based on a decentralized system of governance that defines powers between the center and the periphery. In other words, the Syrian Kurds seek an administrative structure similar to the Russian system of oblasts (provinces). There were Kurdish expectations that Moscow would support the Syrian Kurds’ demands for autonomy, given Russia’s long history of establishing autonomous provinces and understanding the cultural aspirations of ethnic communities, both during the lengthy Soviet rule and in the post-formation of the current Russian Federation.<\/p>\n
Russia’s public advice to the Autonomous Administration to negotiate with Damascus seems disingenuous, as the Administration has already sought to negotiate unsuccessfully and has attempted to involve Moscow in the mediation process. However, Russia appeared more interested in reconciling Damascus and Ankara, even if that reconciliation came at the expense of the Syrian Kurds. Furthermore, Russia has worked to encourage the Turkish government to display more hostility towards the Syrian Kurds rather than attempting to alleviate Turkey’s concerns over so-called \u2018national security\u2019.<\/p>\n
All of this is reflected in Russian official rhetoric that discusses secession projects purportedly prepared by Washington for northeastern Syria without providing any evidence that the US is seeking to establish this so-called \u2018statelet\u2019. The open and public aspect of the relationship between northeastern Syria and the US is based on security concerns and a mutual interest in eliminating ISIS and preventing its resurgence. Washington appears indifferent to establishing any form of political or administrative entity for the local population, including the Kurds, as there are no American commitments in this regard.<\/p>\n
Outside the issue of irritating Turkey, the Russian foreign minister is targeting U.S. policy in Syria and minimizing the impact of its successes, along with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in combating ISIS, while ignoring the evidence on the ground. According to him, Washington has failed in its mission, claiming that “the Americans have not achieved any goals in the fight against terrorism.” This repeated claim appears directed at those who view the presence of U.S. forces in northeastern Syria and the al-Tanf camp as a futile endeavor with no specific timetable. Lavrov implies that the task of tracking down active ISIS cells, which requires patience and close monitoring, is indicative of American \u2018failure.’<\/p>\n
Realistically, the international coalition cannot be considered to have completed its mission, given the risks of the terrorist organization’s return and the increasing activity of its fighters in the deserts of Syria and Iraq. This is true despite the continuous raids and arrests carried out by the SDF and international coalition forces. Lavrov’s words can be interpreted as an expression of Moscow’s failure to sponsor realistic political solutions that encourage Syrians to take over the fight against ISIS instead of relying on the international coalition forces. A political solution, in part, means the departure of all foreign and international coalition forces.<\/p>\n
The Russian Foreign Ministry’s statements regarding the Syrian Kurds cannot be viewed in isolation, as they are primarily directed at Turkey, whether as a blatant provocation or an attempt to win over the Turks. Over the past years, we have seen significant changes in the nature of Russian statements. In 2015, Russia prepared a draft constitution that included the idea of \u2018cultural autonomy\u2019 and aimed to expand the decentralized system. However, it immediately disavowed the draft upon its release. Additionally, it is worth noting that the current foreign minister mentioned the possibility of replicating the Iraqi Kurdistan model as a solution for the Syrian Kurds, suggesting the establishment of a federal system. Yet, shortly thereafter, Russia embarked on a campaign against the autonomy project, linking the current diluted version of autonomy to the idea of creating a mini-state!<\/p>\n
It was expected that Lavrov would adopt a skeptical view about the indefinite viability of the Washington-SDF alliance. He chose to draw a harsh comparison to the \u2018fate of the Afghan leadership\u2019 after the US abandoned it and carried out its rapid withdrawal in 2021, urging that we should learn from the Afghan experience to guard against a similar fate. In this context, it’s also relevant to recall Russia’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, leaving its ally Najibullah to confront his destiny against the blows of the \u2018mujahideen.\u2019 The choice of the Afghan experience may serve as a poor illustration of how great powers can abandon their allies in certain situations, a reality that applies as much to Moscow as it does to Washington. Furthermore, the Afghan case does not serve as a valid benchmark or analogy in any context.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, Lavrov’s statements seem primarily directed at Turkey, nor at the Autonomous Administration or Damascus. His calls for the Syrian Kurds to return to \u2018the path of national dialogue and agree on the conditions of their life within the unified Syrian state with Damascus\u2019 are essentially part of the Kurdish demands, which Russia fails to support seriously, despite the Kurdish petitions submitted to the Foreign Ministry, the entity most familiar with the details of the Kurdish situation, the nature of the Kurdish demands, and their vision for resolving the Syrian crisis.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has a tried-and-true strategy for dealing with the Turks regarding the Syrian file. It is enough for him to trigger Turkey’s pathological fears regarding the Kurds and declare the dangers of the secession of the Autonomous Administration and the creation of a Kurdish entity, which causes Ankara to flinch and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":266,"featured_media":5608,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[10,61],"tags":[38,966,32,725,40,36,964],"ppma_author":[506],"class_list":["post-5605","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-geopolitics","category-slider","tag-isis","tag-lavrov","tag-russia","tag-sdf","tag-syria","tag-turkey","tag-united-states"],"authors":[{"term_id":506,"user_id":266,"is_guest":0,"slug":"shoresh-darwish","display_name":"Shoresh Darwish","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/Shoresh-3.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/Shoresh-3.jpg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5605","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/266"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5605"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5605\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5625,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5605\/revisions\/5625"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5608"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5605"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5605"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5605"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=5605"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}