{"id":5543,"date":"2024-10-02T15:11:06","date_gmt":"2024-10-02T13:11:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/?p=5543"},"modified":"2024-10-02T15:11:06","modified_gmt":"2024-10-02T13:11:06","slug":"syria-turkey-and-egypt-the-risks-rewards-of-repaired-relationships","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/syria-turkey-and-egypt-the-risks-rewards-of-repaired-relationships\/","title":{"rendered":"Syria, Turkey, and Egypt: The Risks & Rewards of Repaired Relationships"},"content":{"rendered":"

Years ago, Turkish officials made statements regarding the management of the Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. In 2015, Turkey\u2019s aggression towards Arab regimes, primarily through Muslim Brotherhood militias and Salafi-jihadist organizations, peaked, deepening the rift between Turkey and Egypt following the ousting of the late President Mohamed Morsi and the end of the Muslim Brotherhood\u2019s rule in Egypt.<\/p>\n

Before analyzing the implications of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi\u2019s first visit to Ankara and his meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan, it is essential to identify two pivotal turning points in Turkey\u2019s policy towards the Arab world, both linked to friction with Russia.<\/p>\n

On November 24, 2015, Turkish defenses shot down a Russian Sukhoi fighter jet in Syria near the Turkish border, leading to an unprecedented breakdown in relations with Russia. This crisis surpassed even the tensions observed during the Cold War caused by NATO bases in Turkey, which are near the former Soviet Union.<\/p>\n

In the aftermath, Turkey\u2019s NATO allies, led by the United States, hesitated to express solidarity, leaving Turkey feeling isolated in its confrontation with Russia. This moment led to a profound realization within Turkey about the dangers of facing Russia alone, prompting a comprehensive reconstruction of its diplomacy. Turkey transitioned from being viewed primarily as a \u201cNATO country\u201d to becoming a \u201cpeaceful meeting ground between NATO and Russia.\u201d However, despite numerous attempts to mediate in the Russian war in Ukraine, Turkey has not succeeded in this role.<\/p>\n

This shift also marked a change in Turkey\u2019s policies towards superpowers, particularly as the 2016 coup attempt reinforced Turkey\u2019s perception that the West not only abandoned it in the face of Russia, but also conspired against it through that coup.<\/p>\n

Consequently, Turkey\u2019s occupation of Syria became coordinated with Russia during operations in northern Aleppo in 2016 and Afrin in 2018. Nevertheless, Turkey\u2019s capitulation to Russia in international politics did not translate into an opening towards the Syrian regime.<\/p>\n

Turkish rhetoric remained sharply critical of Damascus until a second pivotal shift occurred: the deaths of 35 Turkish soldiers in a strike on a Turkish convoy amidst intense battles between regime forces, supported by Russian and Iranian troops, and Turkish forces along with Syrian opposition militias. Following days of escalating Turkish threats\u2014including giving the Syrian army a deadline to withdraw from areas it had recently reclaimed\u2014a new tone emerged from Defense Minister Hulusi Akar. He indicated the intention to send additional reinforcements to Idlib, clarifying that this was not aimed at reoccupying liberated areas but rather at establishing a ceasefire, without mentioning earlier Turkish demands for a ceasefire aligned with Turkish observation post borders.<\/p>\n

The conflict in Idlib dismantled Turkey\u2019s vision for the \u2018Sochi Agreement\u2019, which aimed to open the Aleppo-Latakia highway and expel armed groups from both sides. However, Turkey soon realized it could not continue on this path. Since then, Ankara has quietly embraced a strategy of normalizing relations with the Syrian regime to gain what it can from such an arrangement. This included framing the struggle in northern and eastern Syria (Rojava) against the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a shared battle with the regime, reversing its earlier position of portraying this fight as solely that of pro-Turkish opposition groups.<\/p>\n

After the Idlib battles ceased with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, Turkey found itself devoid of goals or programs in Syria, aside from its conflict with the Autonomous Administration and the SDF. The Syrian regime effectively disappeared from Turkey\u2019s agenda, with the opposition\u2019s psychological narrative reframed to prioritize the war against the Autonomous Administration and Kurdish groups in general. The Syrian regime began to recede from the objectives of these factions as they prepared for the current phase of Turkish normalization with Arab states, which is expected to lead to further reconciliation with the Syrian regime.<\/p>\n

This gradual transition began with the downing of the Russian aircraft in 2015 and reached a peak with the deaths of 35 Turkish soldiers during the Idlib battles on February 27, 2020. Currently, this process is navigating a new diplomatic phase with Arab countries, particularly Egypt, following successful Turkish normalization efforts with Gulf states.<\/p>\n

Before discussing the Egyptian advantages resulting from Turkey\u2019s abandonment of the political Islam project in Arab countries, it is crucial to note that the Syrian regime stands at a critical juncture in Arab-Turkish relations. Contrary to political narratives suggesting significant benefits await Damascus upon accepting a reconciliation deal with Ankara under the auspices of Arab political frameworks, the reality indicates the marginalization of Syria\u2019s role in favor of the dominant interests of leading Arab states.<\/p>\n

Arab nations are actively seeking to compel Syria to reconcile through multi-level pressures, all while preventing Syria from imposing extreme conditions on Ankara. Even regarding Turkey\u2019s representation at Arab League meetings, the Syrian foreign minister finds limited avenues to influence discussions, often reduced to interrupting his Turkish counterpart. This context supports the hypothesis that the Arab states aim to ease the burden of Syria from Arab-Turkish relations, positioning Syria not at the center of this rapprochement, but merely as a tool to expedite relations with Turkey while circumventing Syria’s fundamental demands\u2014particularly regarding the Turkish withdrawal from occupied Syrian territories.<\/p>\n

\"\"
Egyptian President al-Sisi (R) and his Turkish counterpart Erdo\u011fan (L), posing for a picture with their wives Emine (L) and Entissar (R), during a welcome ceremony in Cairo, Egypt, on February 14, 2024. It was Erdo\u011fan\u2019s first visit to Egypt since 2012. (AFP)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

A Region Without Human Rights<\/strong><\/p>\n

The headlines from President Sisi\u2019s recent visit to Turkey revealed no surprises regarding the topics discussed, as outlined in statements from both parties. During talks in Ankara, the Turkish president and his Egyptian counterpart addressed issues such as the war in the Gaza Strip and avenues for mending relations between their two countries, marking Sisi\u2019s first visit to Turkey since assuming the presidency.<\/p>\n

Relations between Ankara and Cairo deteriorated in 2013 when Sisi, then head of the Egyptian army, ousted President Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood following popular protests against his one-year rule. Morsi, viewed as Egypt\u2019s first democratically elected president, was a Turkish ally who visited Turkey during his presidency in 2012.<\/p>\n

By 2020, relations between the two countries began to improve as Ankara launched a diplomatic campaign aimed at easing tensions with regional powers, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Notably, this campaign emerged just months after the Russian-Syrian attack on Turkish forces in Idlib.<\/p>\n

In the previous year, Turkey and Egypt exchanged ambassadors, and Ankara announced plans to supply Cairo with armed drones. Sisi\u2019s visit followed President Erdo\u011fan\u2019s trip to Cairo in February, marking his first visit since 2012 and representing a significant step toward rebuilding relations that had soured over the past decade.<\/p>\n

During his time in Cairo, Erdo\u011fan stated that both countries aimed to increase trade from $10 billion to $15 billion in the short term. He portrayed the situation as a win-win scenario, which could indeed be beneficial if not for Turkey\u2019s hidden agendas related to its national security. For an external observer or a foreign diplomat, understanding the degree of anxiety that Turkey\u2019s focus on national security instills in its diplomacy\u2014both domestically and internationally\u2014can be challenging.<\/p>\n

Regarding Sisi\u2019s visit, Erdo\u011fan stated, \u201cIn a win-win manner of thinking, we will advance our multi-dimensional relations,\u201d adding that Ankara specifically seeks to strengthen ties with Egypt in the natural gas and nuclear energy sectors.<\/p>\n

Ministers from both countries signed 18 memoranda of understanding covering cooperation in various areas, including energy, defense, tourism, health, agriculture, finance, culture, education, and transportation. Erdo\u011fan also highlighted that Ankara and Cairo share a \u201ccommon position\u201d on the Palestinian issue, with Sisi calling for a ceasefire in Gaza and an end to violence in the West Bank.<\/p>\n

In any case, there is no agenda for \u201chuman rights\u201d in the foreign policy of any Middle Eastern country. This situation presents an opportunity for Turkey to silence the covert Arab diplomacy that has raised such issues against Ankara through indirect media channels or human rights organizations, particularly via Western media outlets that highlight negative aspects of human rights related to Turkey.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, Ankara will continue its military policies against the representatives of the Kurdish issue\u2014both domestically and internationally\u2014unimpeded, following the \u2018close box strategy\u2019 declared by Ottoman Interior Minister Talat Pasha regarding Kurdistan and Armenia before the end of World War I.<\/p>\n

Another advantage is that the benefits Arab countries gain from their relationships with Turkey may encourage them to help muffle Damascus\u2019 protests against Ankara, ensuring that Syria does not become a liability in the mutual benefits shared between Turkey and the Arab states. Currently, there is no indication that the Arab rapprochement with Turkey serves Syria\u2014neither the regime, nor the opposition, nor Rojava\u2019s Autonomous Administration. Instead, this rapprochement may very well become a steppingstone in Turkey\u2019s efforts to resolve the Syrian issue entirely.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Years ago, Turkish officials made statements regarding the management of the Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. In 2015, Turkey\u2019s aggression towards Arab regimes, primarily through Muslim Brotherhood militias and Salafi-jihadist organizations, peaked, deepening the rift between Turkey and Egypt following the ousting of the late President Mohamed Morsi and the end of the Muslim Brotherhood\u2019s […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":961,"featured_media":5545,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[10,61],"tags":[917,954,952,953,885,887,48,32,36],"ppma_author":[814],"class_list":["post-5543","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-geopolitics","category-slider","tag-ankara","tag-cairo","tag-egypt","tag-erdogan-sisi","tag-idlib","tag-muslim-brotherhood","tag-rojava","tag-russia","tag-turkey"],"authors":[{"term_id":814,"user_id":961,"is_guest":0,"slug":"the-kurdish-center-for-studies","display_name":"The Kurdish Center for Studies","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/315055790_1372439633161196_1832456394594784694_n.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/315055790_1372439633161196_1832456394594784694_n.jpg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5543","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/961"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5543"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5543\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5550,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5543\/revisions\/5550"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5545"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5543"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5543"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5543"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=5543"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}