{"id":5482,"date":"2024-09-18T08:22:13","date_gmt":"2024-09-18T06:22:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/?p=5482"},"modified":"2024-09-18T15:17:22","modified_gmt":"2024-09-18T13:17:22","slug":"scorched-earth-how-turkey-iran-are-destroying-kurdistan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/scorched-earth-how-turkey-iran-are-destroying-kurdistan\/","title":{"rendered":"Scorched Earth: How Turkey & Iran are Destroying Kurdistan"},"content":{"rendered":"

The scorched earth policy<\/a><\/span> is a military tactic that involves the deliberate destruction of resources that could be beneficial to enemy forces during either an advance or a retreat. This strategy encompasses the demolition of agricultural crops, infrastructure, transportation networks, and other assets that might aid the opposing side. This strategy often results in significant civilian suffering, as it involves the destruction of resources that local populations rely on for survival. It can cause widespread famine, displacement, and economic devastation. In modern warfare, scorched earth policies are considered violations of international humanitarian law, particularly Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention<\/a><\/span>, which protects civilian populations and their means of sustenance.<\/p>\n

Scorched earth policies, involving the deliberate destruction of resources to weaken adversaries, have been used by Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq in their conflicts and oppression against the Kurdish people during the past century, resulting in mass destruction of the environment, communities, infrastructure, culture, etc., which together aim to make Kurdistan unliveable for its inhabitants.<\/p>\n

TURKEY\u2019S SCORCHED EARTH POLICIES<\/strong><\/p>\n

Destruction of Villages and Forced Displacement<\/strong><\/p>\n

During the height of its conflict with the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK) in the 1990s, Turkey implemented a policy of destroying thousands of Kurdish villages in Northern Kurdistan. This strategy aimed to deprive the PKK of local support and resources. By the end of the 1990s, over 3,000<\/a><\/span> Kurdish villages had been razed or evacuated, resulting in the displacement of up to 3 million<\/a><\/span> people. Turkish armed forces would surround a village using helicopters, armoured vehicles, troops, and village guards, and burn stored produce, agricultural equipment, crops, orchards, forests, and livestock. They set fire to houses, often giving the inhabitants no opportunity to retrieve their possessions. During the course of such operations, Turkish forces frequently abused and humiliated Kurdish villagers, stole their property and cash, and ill-treated or tortured them before herding them onto the roads and away from their former homes. The operations were marked by scores of \u201cdisappearances\u201d<\/a> <\/span>and extrajudicial executions.<\/p>\n

More recently, the Turkish military actions in Southern Kurdistan<\/a><\/span> (June-July 2024) have caused significant damage to the region. Since the beginning of the operation, Turkey has conducted 238 attacks, burning over 2,000 hectares of agricultural land across multiple villages. In Guharze and Sargale alone, 55% of the land has been burned.<\/p>\n

Residents of 602 Kurdish and Assyrian villages are at risk of displacement, with 162 villages already evacuated. These attacks have also resulted in the deaths of at least eight civilians and have damaged public infrastructure, including a school in Mizhe village in February, a monastery in Miska village during recent operations, and civilian houses and vehicles in Guharze village.<\/p>\n

Operations in Rojava & Southern Kurdistan<\/strong><\/p>\n

During the operations “Olive Branch<\/a>“<\/span> (2018) in Afrin and “Peace Spring<\/a>“<\/span> (2019) in Sere Kaniye and Gire Sipi, Turkey targeted Kurdish forces in Rojava (northern Syria). These operations involved heavy bombardments that destroyed civilian infrastructure, leading to mass displacement. The Turkish Army and allied jihadist militias burned homes and farmland, resulting in significant destruction and the displacement of residents in the targeted cities.<\/p>\n

Between March 2018 and August 2020, Turkish-backed jihadist groups cut down at least 500,000 olive trees<\/a><\/span> in Afrin and burned hundreds of thousands of hectares of land. The Turkish state has persistently targeted critical<\/a><\/span> infrastructure such as power plants, generators, hospitals, schools, and roads in the region. This systematic destruction aims to weaken the administration and exert additional pressure on civilians, resulting in extreme poverty and forcing half of the population to flee.<\/p>\n

Environmental Degradation<\/strong><\/p>\n

Turkish military operations often involve the deliberate setting of forest fires. For instance, during the 40-year-long anti-PKK operations, large areas of forest and pasture in Northern Kurdistan have been burned. Such actions are aimed at depriving Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party forces of cover and sustenance, but they also devastate local communities and ecosystems in the region. In recent years, these fires have become increasingly frequent, leading to widespread destruction and displacement.<\/p>\n

For instance, in June 2024, massive wildfires in Northern Kurdistan<\/a><\/span>, particularly between Amed (Diyarbak\u0131r) and Merdin (Mardin), resulted in the deaths of 15 people and injuries to 78 others. The fires also killed over 1,000 sheep and goats, with an additional 200 animals suffering severe burns. The extreme heat, with temperatures exceeding 40\u00b0C in the preceding weeks, left vegetation tinder-dry, creating ideal conditions for the inferno, which scorched nearly 2,000 hectares of farmland, residential areas, and forests. The Turkish military also uses weaponizes such wildfires<\/a><\/span> as a cover to cut down entire forests for the purpose of selling the trees for profit.<\/p>\n

\"\"
Trees cut down by the Turkish state while deforesting \u015eirnex in Northern Kurdistan are sold as firewood in provinces such as Urfa, Mara\u015f, and Antep. (Mezopotamya Agency)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The Ilisu Dam on the Tigris River represents another destructive project by the Turkish state that has led to the flooding of numerous Kurdish villages and towns. This project has displaced thousands of residents and submerged cultural and agricultural lands. The dam serves dual purposes: promoting economic development and exerting political control. By restricting the mobility and resources available to the Kurdish population, the dam also impacts Kurdish political parties and their activities.<\/p>\n

The Ilisu Dam project<\/span><\/a> \u00a0flooded 199 villages and the ancient city of Hasankeyf (Hesekef), affecting approximately 100,000 people, primarily Kurds and a significant number of Arabs in Hasankeyf. Forced evacuations in the 1990s had already displaced 23,000 people, and an additional 3,000 nomadic family\u2019s dependent on the Tigris River were impacted by the latest events. More than 40% of those affected did not own land and received no compensation, losing everything. The rest faced inadequate compensation and resettlement plans, leading to the loss of livelihoods, culture, and a future marred by poverty.<\/p>\n

The Ilisu Dam project in Upper Mesopotamia, the \u2018cradle of civilization,\u2019 destroyed over 400 archaeological sites, many of which remain unexplored. Only about 20 sites had been excavated when they were forsaken to be flooded. The 12,000-year-old town of Hasankeyf, a symbol of resistance against the Ilisu Project, was submerged, destroying its rich cultural and biological heritage. Hasankeyf, located on the Silk Road, was historically significant, featuring traces of 20 cultures, numerous monuments, and thousands of human-made caves. Despite meeting nine out of ten UNESCO world heritage criteria, Turkey never applied for UNESCO recognition and impeded any chance at sustainable development and tourism for the site. Currently, the wider region around Hasankeyf, once home to 10,000 people in the 1970s, is one of Turkey’s poorest districts with only 3,000 residents.<\/p>\n

Syria and Iraq, heavily dependent on the Tigris River for agriculture and urban water supply, face significant challenges due to Turkey\u2019s manipulative water policies. The Tigris River, a crucial resource for thousands of years, is governed by the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses<\/a><\/span>, which mandates mutual agreements between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. However, Turkey has not signed this convention. Consequently, Turkey\u2019s actions often disregard the needs of people and the environment, raising concerns about the potential use of water as a political weapon<\/a><\/span> against the populations of South and West Kurdistan, as well as Iraq and Syria, in ancient Mesopotamia.<\/p>\n

Turkey\u2019s use of dams as a strategic tool is particularly evident in Western Kurdistan (Rojava) and northeast Syria. Since 2016, Turkey has intermittently reduced the flow of the Euphrates River, significantly impacting power generation, irrigation, and drinking water supplies, while also causing substantial environmental damage in the region. Over the past few decades, Turkey\u2019s irrigation and power projects have significantly contaminated the Euphrates River and reduced the volume of water flowing to Syria by an estimated 40 percent<\/a><\/span>. According to the 1987 agreement <\/a><\/span>signed between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), Syria is entitled to 500 cubic meters per second of Euphrates water. However, following the construction of the Ataturk Dam, Turkey has allowed only about 200 cubic meters per second to reach Syria. Additionally, the water stored behind the Euphrates Dam has decreased from 14 billion cubic meters to only 10 billion, causing Euphrates Lake to lose 75 percent of its effective reserve. This significant reduction in water levels has led to serious humanitarian crises.<\/p>\n

Targeting of Infrastructure<\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

During military operations, Turkish forces have been known to destroy infrastructure such as water and power plants, schools, hospitals, places of worship, roads, and bridges, aiming to increase pressure on the Kurdish population.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Turkey often justifies this by claiming they are targeting Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) bases and members. This tactic significantly impacts civilians by causing casualties, isolating communities, and disrupting daily life.<\/p>\n

In Shingal region, for instance, in August 2021<\/a><\/span>, Turkish airstrikes targeted Sikeniye Hospital, resulting in the deaths of eight civilians, injuries to over 20 others, and the complete destruction of the building. Likewise, Turkey\u2019s airstrike campaign against Rojava has been ongoing since the 2019 invasion, resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths to date. These periodic and destructive airstrikes target civilian infrastructure in the region. In October 2023<\/span>,<\/a> a campaign systematically targeted Rojava\u2019s electricity, gas, and oil facilities, causing extensive infrastructural and economic damage and further worsening the already fragile humanitarian situation.<\/p>\n

Subsequently, in December 2023<\/a><\/span>, a new campaign targeted factories producing construction materials, agricultural products, and foods, along with grain silos, a mill, industrial sites, and medical facilities. Turkey is re-targeting previously struck energy infrastructure while also hitting factories and warehouses not previously targeted. These airstrikes were initiated in response to operations by the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK) against Turkish military bases in the mountains of Southern Kurdistan (KRI), which resulted in the deaths of nine<\/a><\/span> Turkish soldiers.<\/p>\n

By early January 2024<\/a><\/span>, Turkey targeted over 50 locations<\/a><\/span> across Rojava within four days, conducting airstrikes on key electricity and oil infrastructure, industrial sites, Asayish (Internal Security Forces) checkpoints, factories, and civilian homes. These strikes left over 2 million people without power and water after seven key electricity stations were put out of service. Six civilians, including two children, were injured. Turkey’s repeated and targeted destruction of oil and electricity infrastructure exacerbates the humanitarian crises in a region already plagued by power blackouts, fuel shortages, and water cuts.<\/p>\n

IRAN\u2019S SCORCHED EARTH POLICIES<\/strong><\/p>\n

Cross-Border Bombardments and Attacks<\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

Iran frequently conducts artillery strikes across its border into Southern Kurdistan, targeting bases of Kurdish opposition groups like the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Free Kurdistan Party (PAK), Komala, and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK).<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

These bombardments have led to the destruction of villages and agricultural lands, causing significant displacement and economic damage. For instance, on September 28<\/a><\/span>, 2022, the Iranian military launched approximately 70 missiles at three refugee camps in Koya, Southern Kurdistan. These camps were established in 1995 for Kurds from Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat) fleeing oppression. Before the attack, around 600 families resided in the camps, which have since been evacuated, displacing all residents. The Iranian authorities claimed the bombings targeted Kurdish opposition groups, accusing them of inciting ongoing protests in Kurdistan and Iran following the death of Jina Amini. The bombings prevented nearly 300 students and 30 to return to school.<\/p>\n

\"\"
A Kurdish peshmerga of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) inspects damage to their party headquarters following an Iranian cross-border attack on the town of Koysinjaq, Southern Kurdistan (Iraq) in November 2022. (Safin Hamid \/ AFP)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Denial of Resources<\/strong><\/p>\n

Similar to Turkey, Iran has been setting fire to forests and pastures in Kurdistan for decades to destroy Kurdish forces and parties\u2019 cover and resources. Hundreds of hectares of land burn in these fires every year. The government organizations usually reject helping with containing the fires and it is only the local organizations or villagers who extinguish the fires with the most primitive equipment. Many of them get injured or even lose their lives while containing the fires. This has a devastating impact on local communities reliant on these resources for their livelihoods.<\/p>\n

There have been 697 fires in Iran\u2019s natural areas<\/a><\/span> in 2024, affecting a total of 12,904 hectares of forests and pastures. Notably, the Zagros region accounted for 583 of these fires, impacting 12,600 hectares.<\/p>\n

The rate of forest and pasture destruction in Iran, analyzed by province, indicates that the predominantly Kurdish provinces of Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan (Urmia) have experienced the most fires in recent years. Over 14% of forest and pasture fires in the first half of 2023, for example, occurred in Kurdistan province, despite it comprising only 1.3% of Iran\u2019s forests and pastures. Independent environmental associations report significantly more fires than official statistics. Notably, two high-ranking Iranian provincial officials have cited human intervention as the primary cause of some forest fires in Marivan, Kurdistan Province.<\/p>\n

Over 95% of the fires in the region<\/a><\/span> are caused by deliberate human activities, such as deforestation for agricultural, residential, and commercial purposes, and illegal logging for charcoal production and wood smuggling. Iranian military actions, including manoeuvres and mine explosions, also significantly contribute to these fires.<\/p>\n

The “Alborz Breathing Plan<\/span>,<\/a>” proposed in 2012 and later approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, inadvertently pushed Iranian state-affiliated wood smuggling and charcoal production operations towards Kurdistan. This has led to extensive illegal exploitation of the Zagros Mountain forests, with felled trees transported to major mills in northern Iran and Tabriz. Small-scale violators, operating independently of factory owners, sell timber to middlemen and freely cut down ancient trees, bypassing military checkpoints without interference.<\/p>\n

For instance, in August 2023<\/a><\/span>, over 1,065 hectares of oak forests around Marivan burned, part of a total of 2,035 hectares destroyed that month. In the first half of 2022, more than 5,000 hectares of Marivan’s forests were lost to fires. While current forest area estimates for Marivan are about 100,000 hectares, outdated government statistics range from 170,000 to 185,000 hectares. Over the past 15 years, more than 70,000 hectares of Marivan\u2019s forests have been lost to fires.<\/p>\n

Landmines and Border Security<\/strong><\/p>\n

Iran and Turkey have also strategically used landmines to suppress Kurdish populations<\/a><\/span>, particularly in border regions where conflicts have occurred. These mines, left over from past wars and newly planted by both governments, primarily target areas with significant Kurdish populations. Iran, for instance, has used landmines under the pretext of border security, often to limit the activities of Kurdish political parties, while Turkey continues to plant mines despite international obligations under the Ottawa Convention. The extensive contamination, with millions of landmines in these regions, results in ongoing civilian casualties, severe psychological trauma, and widespread environmental degradation.<\/p>\n

The presence of landmines hinders socio-economic development and forces displacement, disrupting Kurdish communities and undermining their security and livelihoods. Despite the significant humanitarian and financial challenges associated with demining, Iran and Turkey show little interest in removing these mines, as they serve as tools for maintaining control over Kurdish areas. These minefields not only impede militant activities but also make large areas of land unusable for local populations, contributing to economic hardship and displacement. The lack of adequate support and demining efforts from these governments exacerbates the suffering of Kurdish populations, reinforcing the oppressive impact of these explosive remnants of war<\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n

A Summation of the Devastation<\/strong><\/p>\n

The use of scorched earth policies by Turkey and Iran in Kurdistan has resulted in widespread devastation and suffering for the Kurdish population. These tactics, aimed at weakening Kurdish resistance and control, have led to the destruction of villages, forced displacement of communities, and significant environmental damage. The deliberate burning of forests, agricultural lands, and infrastructure not only disrupts the lives of civilians but also contributes to long-term poverty and displacement. These actions violate international humanitarian law and have left a lasting impact on the region\u2019s environment and its people.<\/p>\n

The extensive and systematic nature of these policies underscores the severe measures taken by both Turkey and Iran to suppress the Kurdish population. The human rights abuses, environmental destruction, and economic hardship caused by these tactics highlight the ongoing struggle for control in contested regions. The consequences of these actions are profound, contributing to a cycle of violence, displacement, and poverty that continues to affect millions of people in Kurdistan. The international community must address these violations and work towards a resolution that respects the rights and livelihoods of the Kurdish people.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The scorched earth policy is a military tactic that involves the deliberate destruction of resources that could be beneficial to enemy forces during either an advance or a retreat. This strategy encompasses the demolition of agricultural crops, infrastructure, transportation networks, and other assets that might aid the opposing side. This strategy often results in significant […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":270,"featured_media":5487,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[170,938,939,399,111,875,50,157],"ppma_author":[511],"class_list":["post-5482","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-eastern-kurdistan","tag-iranian-missile-attacks","tag-komala","tag-northern-kurdistan","tag-pdki","tag-pjak","tag-pkk","tag-turkish-invasion"],"authors":[{"term_id":511,"user_id":270,"is_guest":0,"slug":"gordyaen-benyamin-jermayi","display_name":"Gordyaen Benyamin Jermayi","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/1200px-Roj_emblem.svg.png","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/1200px-Roj_emblem.svg.png"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5482","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/270"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5482"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5482\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5498,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5482\/revisions\/5498"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5487"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5482"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5482"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5482"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=5482"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}