It is not possible to verify the credibility of the analysis claiming that Netanyahu pushed Trump into the 12-day war last June and the recent 40-day war, for the unity of purpose in striking the Iranian system does not necessarily imply unity of ultimate objective. Hence, a careful reading of the underlying motives of each party may reveal a degree of difference between the American and Israeli perspectives on the nature of the war and its final outcome.<\/p>\n
Israel has a direct interest in removing the Iranian system from the Middle Eastern scene and bringing in an alternative that definitively acknowledges the existence of the State of Israel, its right to life, and the consideration of its policies, whatever they may be. The essence of the war does not stop at the competitive aspect of managing the Middle East and dominating its economic and political decisions, but rather there is an ideological dimension that holds a cherished place in the ongoing conflict between them. In contrast, the American war appears more ambitious in changing Tehran\u2019<\/span>s behavior and drawing it toward a historic partnership, regardless of the nature of its ruling system\u2014whether it is democratic or adheres to its theocratic and dictatorial approach.<\/p>\n Realistically, the long war since October 7 has halted the Abraham Accords and disabled their most important part when the American diplomatic movement was on the verge of including Saudi Arabia in them. The war also halted the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor (the India Corridor). It was not expected that the war would \u201c<\/span>disable\u201d the two most important projects that would have changed the face of the region, which both the Biden and Trump administrations had heralded. Nor is it merely a disabling effect; it may have an annulling effect, as Riyadh is no longer convinced of the feasibility of normalizing with Tel Aviv. In the context of the prolonged war, calculations have been reassessed, and new parties have emerged on the broader scene.<\/p>\n Against the backdrop of war: are new alliances on the horizon?<\/strong><\/p>\n Among the parties that have emerged forcefully after the 40-day war is Pakistan, as the only nuclear-armed Islamic state, adopting a combat doctrine with national and religious characteristics, possessing military capabilities that can transcend its borders, and forming cohesive alliances and partnerships with countries of the Islamic world, particularly Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The Pakistani role became evident in the period between the two wars and was reinforced by Islamabad\u2019<\/span>s mediation between Washington and Tehran and the convergence of Pakistani military leaders on the region. The American inability to protect the Gulf states from painful Iranian strikes accelerated the choice by Riyadh and Doha for a second layer of protection and deterrence outside the Washington system, benefiting from Pakistan\u2019<\/span>s military positioning in the region, its economic needs, and its 900-kilometer shared border with Iran, which puts pressure on Iran should it continue to harm the Kingdom.<\/p>\n As a result of the sovereign risks surrounding Saudi Arabia, the emergence of Pakistan as a promising ideological military power in the region, and Turkey\u2019<\/span>s discovery of the elixir of deterrence represented by ballistic and hypersonic missiles and its desire to invest in this sector, the outcome of these fears and aspirations could lead to the creation of a new regional axis\/alliance based on three principles: preserving centralized states in the region, becoming a counterweight to Israeli power and its alliances in the region (Israel, India, UAE, Ethiopia, Greece), and guarding international energy lines, securing them, and channeling them for the benefit of their economies. The possibility of such an alliance (referred to in the media as an Islamic NATO) had already begun to take shape in the period between the 12-day war and the 40-day war.<\/p>\n Open options<\/b><\/p>\n Washington has a basket of options it can resort to regarding Iranian intransigence in entering into negotiations that would lead to a lasting peace and partnership. Practically, the heirs of Ayatollah Khamenei cannot renew or modify the ideology of \u201c<\/span>God\u2019<\/span>s government\u201d declared by Ruhollah Khomeini over four decades ago, based on \u201c<\/span>death to America\u201d described as the \u201c<\/span>Great Satan,\u201d for it is not easy to reconcile with Satan according to the strict view of the Islamic Republic. Moreover, the Iranian regime in its current state lacks a supreme leader with the charisma and presence that would allow him to \u201c<\/span>drink the cup of poison\u201d this time as well.<\/p>\n The occurrence of such a divergence and abandonment of the theoretical foundations of the Islamic Republic would change the face of Iran and the region, but such a scenario seems unlikely to materialize despite Washington\u2019<\/span>s seriousness in incorporating Iran into the matrix of countries that could impose a soft blockade on China by cutting off energy supply chains going to it.<\/p>\n Among the American options, aside from a third round of war, is the option of imposing a suffocating siege on the Iranians originating from the Strait of Hormuz\u2014an option that was initially Iranian\u2014and then leaving the Iranian system to suffer from the effects of the recent war without receiving the necessary economic relief. The option of leaving Iran to disintegrate from within resembles George H.W. Bush\u2019<\/span>s approach of leaving Saddam Hussein\u2019<\/span>s regime to rot from within as Iraq collapsed in slow fire between 1991 and 2003. Additionally, Washington could rely on energy supply routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Here, the roles of regional countries seeking to play a new role in energy pathways and strengthen their international presence come to the fore. If this option requires a long time and internal stability in the countries through which energy routes would pass, then leaning toward such an option would mean harming Iran even if it decided to abandon the idea of controlling Hormuz.<\/p>\n In contrast, Iran has the ability to remind of its importance by keeping energy markets in turmoil through intermittent manipulation of the Strait of Hormuz or activating what remains of its regional allies. Notably, Tehran has saved its Houthi ally for this war, and it might later resort to activating the \u201c<\/span>Ansar Allah\u201d card.<\/p>\n Given the remaining options for both parties, the game of mutual harm seems exhausting for both, as well as for other parties that found themselves caught in the war against their will. Here, Israel appears less sensitive to what is happening in the world and the region due to its lack of responsibilities, but it will remain in an active state of war against Hezbollah and similar groups, and a non-active war against Iran and matters related to the Iranian nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and drones, regardless of how American options may conflict with Tel Aviv\u2019<\/span>s interests.<\/p>\n Where does the American-Israeli divergence lie?<\/b><\/p>\n The nature of the Trumpian war can be seen as having a trajectory that goes beyond Iran, as it is part of a cold war against China. This means that squeezing Beijing begins with tightening control over the entire Middle East and cutting off oil supplies to China. The starting point of this project is Iran, or rather, the silent American-Chinese war is taking place on Iranian territory and its surroundings.<\/p>\n Changing the Iranian leadership\u2019<\/span>s hostile behavior toward the United States could contribute to expanding the American alliance in the region, even if changing behavior means changing the rules of the game and imposing a new partnership in managing the region in which Tehran becomes a determining factor for traffic in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, which could elevate it to the level of \u201c<\/span>policeman\u201d of the Gulf with American will, which in some respect could mean incorporating Tehran into an Islamabad-Ankara-Riyadh alliance. This promising idea might cause concern for Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi as it would mean a decline in their role in the region and possibly the erosion of their alliance.<\/p>\n Here, the American-Israeli divergence can be described as stemming from the duality of supreme interest and international responsibility. Contrary to America\u2019<\/span>s interest and responsibility, Tel Aviv does not bear responsibility for the explosion of conditions in Iran and its transformation into a failed state torn by civil wars, ethnic conflicts, the spread of extremism within and around it, and the occurrence of migration and displacement movements to neighboring countries and Europe. Ultimately, what matters is getting rid of the existential enemy and its arms in the region at whatever cost, in addition to weakening the Iranian central state and making it a state without imperialist and expansionist ambitions, while the Trump administration thinks of maintaining the minimum for Iran to survive as a potential partner in managing the Middle East, regardless of the form of its ruling system.<\/p>\n Throughout the long experiences of regional countries in dealing with Israel, a model emerges of prioritizing American national interests, which can be summarized as follows: a country can be an ally of Washington while at the same time not being normalized with or in a peace process with Israel. The examples of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan serve this purpose. If things move toward an American-Iranian agreement, the latter will not be obliged to conclude a parallel agreement with Israel, which keeps Tel Aviv in a prolonged state of alert.<\/p>\n In light of the divergence and the differing American and Israeli perspectives, Iran\u2019<\/span>s refusal to accept a peace offer (imposed by force) might push Washington to consider the uniquely Israeli option of annihilating the Iranian system, dismantling it, and burdening it with blockade and internal chaos.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" It is not possible to verify the credibility of the analysis claiming that Netanyahu pushed Trump into the 12-day war last June and the recent 40-day war, for the unity of purpose in striking the Iranian system does not necessarily imply unity of ultimate objective. Hence, a careful reading of the underlying motives of each […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":266,"featured_media":14451,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[57,724,965,934,1024,1058,36,964],"ppma_author":[506],"class_list":["post-14450","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-nethanyahu","tag-president-trump","tag-qatar","tag-saudi-arabia","tag-turkey","tag-united-states"],"authors":[{"term_id":506,"user_id":266,"is_guest":0,"slug":"shoresh-darwish","display_name":"Shoresh Darwish","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/Shoresh-3.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/Shoresh-3.jpg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14450","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/266"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14450"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14450\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14452,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14450\/revisions\/14452"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14451"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14450"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14450"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14450"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=14450"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}