{"id":14444,"date":"2026-04-27T13:36:54","date_gmt":"2026-04-27T11:36:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/?p=14444"},"modified":"2026-04-27T13:36:54","modified_gmt":"2026-04-27T11:36:54","slug":"between-recognition-and-containment-reshaping-the-position-of-the-kurds-in-the-syrian-state-post-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/between-recognition-and-containment-reshaping-the-position-of-the-kurds-in-the-syrian-state-post-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Between Recognition and Containment: Reshaping the Position of the Kurds in the Syrian State Post-2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

Abstract <\/strong><\/p>\n

This paper addresses the transformations in the position of the Kurds in Syria after 2026, within the context of the disintegration of the broad autonomy model and the beginning of a gradual integration process into the Syrian state. It proceeds from the hypothesis that what has occurred cannot be explained within the binary of victory or defeat but rather represents a complex repositioning within a state structure still undergoing reconstruction.<\/p>\n

The paper suggests that the current transformation does not reflect a complete return to the pre-2011 centralism but rather the formation of a pattern of flexible centralism, where the center retains sovereign decision-making in exchange for limited local margins in administration and security. In this context, the Kurds have moved from a state of unrecognized de facto autonomy to a state of limited political recognition without sovereignty, within unstable negotiating arrangements.<\/p>\n

The paper argues that the effectiveness of this transformation is determined not only by the balance of power with the state but also by the degree of Kurdish actor cohesion and its ability to transform its institutional legacy into organized political negotiating capital within state institutions. It concludes that the current phase represents a transition from a broad geographical autonomy model to a more focused political and institutional influence, while the path for renegotiation remains open under more constrained conditions.<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

The developments witnessed in Syria since the beginning of 2026 have reintroduced a pivotal question in post-conflict state studies: whether the integration of the Autonomous Administration into the Syrian state represents a return to centralism or the emergence of a hybrid form of governance.<\/p>\n

This question cannot be answered within a simplified binary formula, as the data reveals a dual path. On one hand, the Autonomous Administration has lost the components of de facto autonomy, including control over strategic resources and the extensive military structure (Strachota, 2026; Billion, 2026). On the other hand, the Kurdish actor has not been completely marginalized but has been reintegrated into negotiating arrangements that have led to a degree of political and cultural recognition, albeit limited and conditional (Alloush, 2026; Mishra, 2026).<\/p>\n

This paper proceeds from the hypothesis that political rights in post-conflict environments are determined not primarily by legal texts but by multi-dimensional power balances, including military, political, institutional, and social factors (North et al., 2009; Tilly, 1992). Accordingly, the current transformation does not represent the end of the Kurdish issue but a repositioning within a state still suffering from institutional fragility and tensions with multiple local actors (Hawach and Drevon, 2026).<\/p>\n

In this context, what is happening does not appear to be a complete restoration of state centralism but rather its reshaping into a flexible centralism where the center retains sovereign decision-making in exchange for allowing functional local margins in administration and security (Gourlay, 2026; Karadjis, 2026). Consequently, the importance of the analysis is not limited to describing what the Kurds lost of de facto autonomy but extends to understanding what remains of their capabilities and how the accumulated institutional, military, and administrative legacy can be transformed into political negotiating capital within the state (Alloush, 2026).<\/p>\n

The paper also raises a complementary question: whether the contraction of the geographical scope of the Autonomous Administration leads to a decline in political effectiveness or its transformation from broad geographical autonomy to more focused institutional influence within the state structure.<\/p>\n

Based on this problematique, the paper addresses the current transformation by analyzing the nature of the autonomy model, the dimensions of its fragility, the path of collapse and reintegration, the limits of political recognition, and the role of the institutional legacy in reproducing influence within the Syrian state.<\/p>\n

Theoretical Framework: State, Power, and Negotiated Rights<\/strong><\/p>\n

This paper relies on an analytical approach that combines literature on state building, state-in-society, decentralization, and hybrid governance, while benefiting from international law approaches related to self-determination. This framework aims to explain the transformation in the Kurds’ position within the Syrian state as a product of power balances, not merely a reflection of legal texts or institutional arrangements.<\/p>\n

State-building literature proceeds from the hypothesis that the state is formed not only through formal institutions but through its ability to organize violence, control resources, and impose political order. This perspective emphasizes that the emergence and stability of authority are linked to the center’s ability to monopolize violence and organize political relations within its domain (Tilly, 1992). North et al.’s approach also indicates that institutional stability requires containing violence within sustainable political and economic arrangements, a condition not yet fully realized in the Syrian case (North et al., 2009).<\/p>\n

Alongside this, state-in-society literature offers a different understanding of the relationship between the state and local actors, where the state does not operate as an entity separate from society but through negotiated relationships with local forces seeking to penetrate and reshape it from within (Migdal, 2001). According to this perspective, political influence is not limited to a position outside the state but also includes the ability to entrench within its institutions and influence their functions. This framework allows understanding the Kurdish transformation as a transition from a semi-independent position to one reproduced within the state structure.<\/p>\n

As for the literature on decentralization and hybrid governance, it proceeds from the premise that post-conflict environments rarely return to fully stable or unified state models but tend to produce arrangements combining centralism and decentralization to varying degrees. In this context, the emerging pattern in Syria can be understood as closer to managed administrative decentralization, where the center retains sovereign decision-making in exchange for granting local actors limited executive roles in administration, services, and local security (Herbst, 2000; Migdal, 2001).<\/p>\n

For analytical purposes, this paper adopts three interrelated operational concepts:<\/p>\n

First, the concept of flexible centralism, referring to a governance pattern where the center retains control over strategic decisions and sovereign resources, while allowing limited functional local margins. This formula does not represent genuine political decentralization but a managed redistribution of functions within a central framework.<\/p>\n

Second, the concept of recognition without sovereignty, expressing a pattern of political integration where a local actor is recognized as a political and cultural party, without granting it legal independence or sovereign authority. This concept allows interpreting the transition from exclusion to limited recognition within the state structure.<\/p>\n

Third, the concept of institutional capital, meaning the sum of administrative expertise, organizational cadres, security structures, and political relationships accumulated by the local actor during a previous phase. This capital does not fade with the decline of geographical control but can transform into a negotiating resource within the state, provided there is the ability to organize and employ it in a coordinated manner.<\/p>\n

These approaches are integrated with international law literature on self-determination, which indicates that this right in “non-colonial” contexts mostly acts as a negotiating framework rather than a self-executing rule (Radpey, 2020). Accordingly, political rights in such cases are shaped through the interaction between law and power balances, not through legal texts in isolation from the political context.<\/p>\n

Based on this, current Kurdish rights are understood as negotiated rights, i.e., rights that are extracted and maintained through a position within the power balance, not as stable legal entitlements. This framework leads to a focus on how to use available resources within the state, rather than limiting analysis to what has been lost outside it.<\/p>\n

The Emergence of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration and its Structural Nature<\/strong><\/p>\n

The autonomy model in northern and eastern Syria emerged in the context of the disintegration of state authority after 2012, when the withdrawal of government forces from vast areas in the northeast allowed the emergence of a political and security vacuum. However, this vacuum did not automatically turn into chaos; rather, it was exploited by an organized political and organizational actor to build semi-independent local governance structures, benefiting from a prior accumulation in party and military organization and a long legacy of national marginalization.<\/p>\n

This model was not the product of a single factor but was shaped by the interaction of three main elements. First, the presence of an organizational structure capable of quickly filling the vacuum and imposing a form of authority. Second, the absence of the state or the decline of its ability to impose direct control. Third, subsequent international support in the context of the war against the Islamic State, which provided a military and political umbrella allowing the model to expand and enhance its continuity (Borain, 2022; Strachota, 2026).<\/p>\n

Although the political discourse accompanying this model presented it as a form of decentralization or local governance, its actual structure was characterized by a hybrid nature. On one hand, local councils and service institutions with representative characteristics were built; on the other hand, strategic decision-making remained centralized within a specific party and military structure. Thus, the model combined elements of decentralization in discourse and the administrative level with actual centralism in political and military decision-making (Wimmer, 2024; McGee, 2022).<\/p>\n

The stability of this model during the expansion phase relied on the confluence of three main sources of power. The first was military capability, which provided protection and control over the geographical space. The second was control over strategic resources, particularly oil, which provided a relative economic base. The third source was international support, which played a decisive role in stabilizing the balance with local and regional adversaries. This confluence allowed the production of a form of de facto governance without official recognition, based on a balance of power rather than a stable institutional settlement.<\/p>\n

However, this model was not homogeneous across the geographical or social space. It expanded during the war to include predominantly Arab areas, especially in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, which led to a gap between military control and the social structure. While the model was more deeply rooted in the Kurdish core areas, it remained less established in the areas annexed during the expansion, limiting its ability to produce a coherent political legitimacy across the geographical space (Karadjis, 2026).<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the geographical space itself was characterized by fragmentation and discontinuity, as there was no stable regional interconnection between Afrin, Kobani, and Al-Jazira. This factor constituted a structural constraint on the possibility of transforming military control into a stable long-term political entity.<\/p>\n

Besides, the expansion did not eliminate pluralism within the Kurdish actor itself, whether at the political or organizational level. Although this pluralism did not appear as a weakness during the ascent phase, it constituted a latent constraint on the ability to unify political decision-making, the effect of which would become more evident in the decline phase.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, the autonomy model can be understood as a form of hybrid governance that emerged under exceptional circumstances and relied on circumstantial balances between military power, international support, and institutional vacuum. This model allowed the production of extensive de facto governance, but it did not transform into a stable institutional arrangement, due to its reliance on conditions that were not sustainable in the long term.<\/p>\n

Structural Contradictions and the Fragility of the Autonomy Model<\/strong><\/p>\n

The decline of the autonomy model cannot be explained solely by external factors, as its internal structure contained contradictions that limited its sustainability. These contradictions appear at interconnected levels related to the nature of authority, social structure, economy, and political organization.<\/p>\n

At the institutional level, the decentralized discourse was coupled with actual centralization in political and military decision-making. The model presented itself as based on local councils and pluralism, yet the centers of strategic decision-making remained limited and centralized, reflecting a hybrid nature combining formal decentralization and actual centralism in governance (Wimmer, 2024; McGee, 2022). This disparity reduced the ability of grassroots institutions to have actual influence on decision-making, limiting the participatory nature of the model.<\/p>\n

At the social level, geographical expansion was not accompanied by a comparable degree of political integration. The model included predominantly Arab areas that were not part of its social base, especially in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, leading to a gap between administrative and military control on one hand and social acceptance on the other (Karadjis, 2026). In light of this disparity, the model’s legitimacy remained uneven across its regions, and control did not transform into stable political integration.<\/p>\n

At the economic level, the model was unable to build a balanced developmental base despite the availability of significant resources, especially oil. The management of these resources remained centralized and did not turn into a lever for a sustainable local economy. The economy also remained linked to war conditions and external relations, limiting its ability to achieve long-term stability (Borain, 2022; Wimmer, 2024).<\/p>\n

At the security level, the model operated within a context of continuous conflict, which gave priority to the military structure at the expense of expanding political participation. As security became a prerequisite for survival, the space for civilian work shrank, and political decision-making became more linked to military considerations, leading to an imbalance between society and authority (Borain, 2022).<\/p>\n

Besides, the geographical space was characterized by fragmentation and discontinuity, as there was no stable regional interconnection between Afrin, Kobani, and Al-Jazira. This factor constituted a structural constraint on the possibility of building a coherent political entity and limited the ability to defend the geographical space uniformly (Karadjis, 2026).<\/p>\n

The demographic structure also played a crucial role in this fragility. The space subject to the model was not homogeneous but included areas with different population compositions, especially in the areas it expanded into during the war. This disparity led to difficulty in transforming military control into stable political legitimacy, which aligns with state-building literature on the importance of congruence between control and social structure (Tilly, 1992).<\/p>\n

These factors cannot be separated from the political and organizational pluralism within the Kurdish actor itself. With the presence of multiple parties with different orientations, it was not easy to formulate a unified political position or a long-term strategy, limiting the ability to deal coherently with subsequent transformations.<\/p>\n

Thus, the model was fragile not only due to external pressures but also due to the interplay of internal constraints that limited its sustainability. It combined a broad political ambition with a disparate geographical space, a decentralized discourse with a centralized decision-making structure, and rapid military expansion with limited social integration. As the balance of power changed, these contradictions turned from latent constraints into direct factors accelerating decline.<\/p>\n

From Negotiation Failure to the Collapse of Balance<\/strong><\/p>\n

The transformation witnessed in the regions of northern and eastern Syria after 2026 was not a sudden event but came after a phase of stalled negotiations that revealed a structural divergence in each party’s vision of the state’s nature. The state insisted on the principle of monopolizing violence and the unity of institutions, while the Kurdish actor sought to maintain a margin of security and administrative autonomy, including formulas for the collective integration of its forces into a military structure not completely dismantled (van Wilgenburg, 2026).<\/p>\n

This divergence was not easily resolvable, as it did not merely concern power-sharing within a single model but a conflict between two different visions of the state. Consequently, negotiations remained limited in outcome and prone to stalling with every change in the balance of power.<\/p>\n

The decisive transformation came with a clear shift in this balance in favor of Damascus. This coincided with declining international support, increasing regional pressures, alongside internal disturbances in some areas, especially those where the model was not socially entrenched. The interplay of these factors led to the accelerated loss of control over urban centers and strategic resources, which directly reflected on the Kurdish actor’s ability to maintain a comparable negotiating position (Strachota, 2026; Billion, 2026; Stevenson, 2026).<\/p>\n

This transformation was characterized by both cumulative and rapid nature simultaneously. The loss of resources and main centers was not an isolated event but led to a cascading collapse in the administrative and military structure, where the ability to manage the geographical space declined, internal pressures increased, and maintaining institutional cohesion became more difficult.<\/p>\n

The international factor also played a decisive role in redefining the boundaries of political possibility. The support that had been one of the pillars of the model’s stability declined, replaced by an increasing international trend towards reintegrating these areas into the Syrian state, which reduced the margin of maneuver and imposed a new reality on the negotiation path (Jeffrey and Margolin, 2025; Abdulkareem, 2026; Gourlay, 2026).<\/p>\n

This path cannot be separated from the regional environment, where regional balances, including the Turkish role, contributed to reducing the options available to the Kurdish actor, whether through military pressure or by influencing the positions of international actors. This made the option of continuing a semi-independent model more costly and less sustainable.<\/p>\n

Thus, the negotiation path shifted from a state of relative negotiation between parties of comparable capacity to a state where the terms are dictated by the stronger party. Negotiations no longer revolved around the form of power-sharing but around the terms of integration into a state structure being reasserted.<\/p>\n

This phase reveals that negotiation outcomes in post-conflict environments are not predetermined by texts but are reshaped as the balance of power changes. Accordingly, what happened was not the result of an agreement but a consequence of a transformation in the conditions of negotiation itself.<\/p>\n

The Ongoing Integration and the New Governance Pattern<\/strong><\/p>\n

What is happening in northern and eastern Syria cannot be understood as an event concluded by signing political or military arrangements but should be viewed as an ongoing process reshaping the relationship between the center and the regions on several levels. This process has included transferring control over strategic resources, crossings, and sovereign structures to the state, alongside reorganizing the military presence through partial and controlled integration formulas, as well as integrating administrative structures into state institutions (Crisis Group, 2026).<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, this transformation has not led to a complete dismantling of local structures, as some forms of local administration and security have continued, especially in the Kurdish core areas. Moreover, some integration formulas, particularly in Al-Hasakah and Kobani, have been partial, with specific roles preserved for some local actors within the new institutional framework (Karadjis, 2026).<\/p>\n

This suggests that the emerging pattern is not a rigid return to centralism but a reshaping of it into flexible centralism. In this pattern, the center retains control over sovereign decision-making, including top appointments, resource management, and public policy formulation, while local actors are granted limited executive roles in administration, services, and daily security.<\/p>\n

The emerging institutional pattern in northern and eastern Syria can be understood through the distinction made in decentralization literature among administrative deconcentration, functional delegation, and political devolution (Rondinelli, 1981; Falleti, 2005). While the latter pattern refers to a genuine transfer of political and financial authority to local units enjoying legal independence and representative legitimacy, the data in the Syrian case does not support the existence of a transition of this type. This arrangement approximates a combination of administrative deconcentration and functional delegation, where some tasks are redistributed without a genuine transfer of political authority. Local institutions do not operate as independent units with full representative legitimacy but within an operational margin subject to central supervision, making the existing decentralization managed decentralization rather than political decentralization.<\/p>\n

The existence of these margins does not change the overall trend towards recentralization but reshapes it. The critical element is not the persistence of local structures per se but who determines strategic decision-making and who controls sovereign resources and violence. With the center retaining these elements, local administration becomes part of a broader central structure, not an alternative to it.<\/p>\n

At the same time, this formula serves several functions. It reduces the cost of direct control over areas, allows for the absorption of local tensions, and provides a degree of stability without needing to rebuild complete central control. It also allows absorbing local actors into the state rather than leaving them outside it.<\/p>\n

However, the effectiveness of this local margin is determined not by its formal existence but by the ability of local actors to activate it. This margin may remain of limited impact if confined to executive roles, or it may transform into a sphere of negotiating influence if used to establish a continuous institutional presence within state apparatuses.<\/p>\n

Thus, the ongoing integration does not represent the end of the role of local actors but redefines the conditions of this role. Influence is no longer linked to broad geographical control but to the ability to operate within state institutions and influence their functions within limits set by the center.<\/p>\n

Recognition without Sovereignty: The Nature and Limits of the Gain<\/strong><\/p>\n

Despite the clear decline in de facto autonomy, the ongoing transformation cannot be understood as a return to the previous state of exclusion. The position of the Kurds within the Syrian state has witnessed a qualitative shift, from structural marginalization to the position of a recognized actor within the process of negotiation and institutional reordering. This is evident in their inclusion in administrative and security arrangements, the recognition of some cultural and linguistic rights, and the continuation of limited forms of local administration in certain areas (Alloush, 2026; Mishra, 2026; Karadjis, 2026).<\/p>\n

However, this shift does not amount to a partnership in sovereignty, nor does it establish a stable form of self-rule. The ongoing integration occurs within a framework where the state retains control over strategic decision-making, making recognition exist within limits set by the center. Thus, the current gain does not represent a genuine transfer of authority but a conditional political integration.<\/p>\n

This pattern reveals a fundamental paradox in the ongoing transformation. On one hand, de facto autonomy has clearly declined, with the loss of control over resources and the wide geographical space. On the other hand, relative progress has been achieved in the position of political recognition within the state. This means the transformation cannot be understood within the logic of profit or loss but as a repositioning that combines decline in some dimensions with progress in others.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, this recognition remains of limited impact if it does not transform into organized institutional presence. Its remaining at the level of general or symbolic arrangements makes it subject to reinterpretation or rollback, especially in the absence of stable legal guarantees. Furthermore, its negotiated nature makes it dependent on the continuation of the power balance, not on a protected legal status.<\/p>\n

This limitation increases given the political pluralism within the Kurdish actor. The distribution of this recognition among multiple uncoordinated parties may weaken its cumulative effect and turn it from a buildable gain into a fragmented situation difficult to transform into actual influence within state institutions.<\/p>\n

Thus, the challenge is not in obtaining recognition per se but in how to use it. This recognition may remain limited if not accompanied by organizational capacity, or it may become a starting point for building institutional influence if employed within a clear strategy.<\/p>\n

The Institutional Legacy as Political Capital<\/strong><\/p>\n

If the analysis has clarified what the Kurdish actor lost in terms of de facto autonomy and broad geographical space, the picture remains incomplete without considering what it accumulated during the years of autonomy in terms of capabilities and experiences that can be re-employed. This experience produced an integrated structure of administrative cadres, organizational expertise, local security structures, as well as networks of political and international relations and accumulated negotiating experience.<\/p>\n

This legacy does not fade with the decline of geographical control but continues as a latent resource that can be transformed into political capital within the state. This is represented by the ability to operate within official institutions, participate in managing local affairs, and influence policy implementation at the daily level, beyond the limited executive role if used systematically.<\/p>\n

However, this transformation does not happen automatically. The existence of this stock does not necessarily mean its transformation into actual influence, as its effectiveness depends on the availability of a basic condition: the ability to organize and coordinate it. In light of political and organizational pluralism, and with the presence of multiple decision-making centers, this legacy faces the risk of fragmentation, being used in parallel and unintegrated ways, weakening its cumulative effect.<\/p>\n

Also, the absence of clear mechanisms for reintegrating cadres and expertise into the state’s institutional structure may leave this stock outside political action or turn it into unutilized capabilities. In this case, the institutional legacy does not disappear, but it loses its negotiating value.<\/p>\n

Conversely, this stock can transform into a source of influence if activated through practical pathways. These include reintegrating administrative cadres into official institutions, maintaining a presence in service sectors and local administration, employing security expertise within a recognized framework, alongside the continuation of organized political work within state institutions.<\/p>\n

From this perspective, the question is no longer about preserving the autonomy model in its previous form but about how to use what it produced within a different context. With the contraction of the geographical space, the focus shifts to institutional influence within the state as an alternative to direct control outside it.<\/p>\n

Thus, the institutional legacy is not merely remnants of a previous phase but constitutes a potential tool for reproducing influence under new conditions. However, the realization of this potential remains conditional on the ability of actors to treat it as a shareable, coordinated common stock, not as a resource distributed among competing parties.<\/p>\n

The Recentering of the Kurdish Space<\/strong><\/p>\n

With the contraction of the geographical space encompassed by the autonomy model during the years of expansion, the possibility emerges for a recentering of the Kurdish issue around the historical core areas, particularly Afrin, Kobani, and Al-Jazira. This transformation does not merely reflect a geographical retreat but can be understood as a recalibration of the political space to align with the actual social structure.<\/p>\n

During the expansion phase, the geographical extension provided greater political and military weight, but it also carried structural fragility resulting from demographic heterogeneity and weak political integration in some areas, especially within the Arab areas annexed during the war (Karadjis, 2026). As this space contracts, focusing on areas with deeper social roots becomes a more sustainable negotiating option.<\/p>\n

In this context, the return of files such as Afrin and Sere Kaniye gains particular importance, not only for their humanitarian or demographic dimension but as part of redefining the space around which political demands can be centered. This indicates that the contraction of the previous model does not mean the disappearance of the Kurdish issue but its transformation into a more focused scope within the historical Kurdish space (Karadjis, 2026; Gourlay, 2026).<\/p>\n

This transformation also allows for the possibility of reducing the contradiction between political control and social structure, a contradiction that constituted one of the sources of fragility in the previous phase. The more the political space aligns with the demographic composition, the greater the chances of producing more stable legitimacy, especially in a post-conflict environment highly sensitive to issues of representation and identity (Hawach and Drevon, 2026).<\/p>\n

However, this transition does not happen automatically, as it requires reordering political priorities and directing negotiating effort towards this more coherent space, rather than continuing to defend a broad geographical model that has lost its conditions for sustainability. The success of this approach is also linked to the ability of actors to coordinate their positions and avoid reproducing the fragmentation that previously limited negotiating effectiveness.<\/p>\n

Thus, geographical contraction does not necessarily mean a decline in effectiveness but may constitute an entry point for rebuilding it on a more realistic basis, if accompanied by better organization of representation and more effective use of available political resources.<\/p>\n

Practical Implications for the Behavior of the Kurdish Actor<\/strong><\/p>\n

The preceding analysis leads to a set of implications that can guide the behavior of the Kurdish actor in the current Syrian context, as strategic principles related to the nature of the phase rather than circumstantial recommendations.<\/p>\n

First, the transition from de facto autonomy to institutional integration should not be understood as a loss of effectiveness but as a repositioning within the state structure. Accordingly, strengthening presence within official institutions becomes a central tool for reproducing influence, especially in environments where authority is shaped through the interaction between state and society (Migdal, 2001).<\/p>\n

Second, experience reveals that reliance on a single source of power generates high fragility. The decline in international support and the imbalance in military power led to a reshaping of the terms of negotiation, suggesting that political sustainability requires diversifying sources of power, including political representation, local resources, and external relations (Jeffrey and Margolin, 2025; Strachota, 2026).<\/p>\n

Third, given the negotiated nature of current gains, the priority of transforming these gains into more stable arrangements by gradually entrenching them within legal and administrative frameworks emerges, rather than treating them as final outcomes. Rights in such contexts remain linked to the balance of power and subject to renegotiation (Radpey, 2020).<\/p>\n

Fourth, under a pattern of flexible centralism, a gradual strategy becomes more effective than zero-sum approaches. A limited local margin can transform into institutional influence if systematically invested, whereas seeking to restore a broad model that has lost its conditions may lead to further decline (Gourlay, 2026; Hawach and Drevon, 2026).<\/p>\n

Fifth, political effectiveness is linked to the degree of internal coordination. Political and organizational pluralism, if not accompanied by a minimum of coordination, may lead to the dissipation of institutional capital rather than transforming it into coherent negotiating power. Thus, building coordination frameworks becomes a prerequisite for maximizing the benefit from available resources.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

This paper demonstrates that the transformations in the position of the Kurds in Syria after 2026 cannot be understood as a simple end to the autonomy model nor a complete return to pre-2011 centralism, but rather a complex reshaping of the relationship between the state and local actors within a post-conflict context.<\/p>\n

The change in the power balance ended the broad de facto autonomy, but it did not lead to complete exclusion. Instead, it led to the Kurds’ transition towards a position of political recognition within the state. However, this recognition remains limited and conditional, and does not amount to a partnership in sovereignty, making it subject to renegotiation in the absence of stable institutional guarantees.<\/p>\n

The paper also shows that the emerging pattern is not rigid centralism but flexible centralism, in which the state retains sovereign decision-making in exchange for limited local margins in administration and security. This means that political effectiveness is no longer linked to broad geographical control but to the ability to operate within state institutions and influence their functions.<\/p>\n

In this context, the potential of the Kurdish actor is determined not only by its relationship with the state but also by its degree of internal cohesion and ability to organize its resources. The institutional legacy accumulated during the autonomy phase constitutes a resource capable of being re-employed, but it does not automatically transform into political power; rather, it depends on the existence of mechanisms for coordination and activation within the new structure.<\/p>\n

Thus, the current phase does not reflect a binary of loss or gain, but a transition from de facto autonomy without recognition to political recognition without sovereignty, within a state structure still undergoing reconstruction. The path remains open for recentering and negotiation, but under more constrained conditions requiring more realistic and organized strategies.<\/p>\n

Methodological Note<\/strong><\/p>\n

Generative artificial intelligence tools were used in some stages of preparing this paper as an auxiliary tool for organizing ideas, improving linguistic formulation, and rearranging the initial structure of the text. However, the construction of the scientific argument, selection of the theoretical framework, analysis of sources, formulation of final conclusions, and verification of the integrity of references were all carried out under the sole responsibility of the researcher. All outputs resulting from the use of these tools were subjected to critical review and scientific verification before being adopted in the final version.<\/p>\n

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Abstract This paper addresses the transformations in the position of the Kurds in Syria after 2026, within the context of the disintegration of the broad autonomy model and the beginning of a gradual integration process into the Syrian state. It proceeds from the hypothesis that what has occurred cannot be explained within the binary of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3561,"featured_media":14445,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[549,41,40],"ppma_author":[1290],"class_list":["post-14444","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-autonomous-administration-of-north-and-east-syria","tag-kurds","tag-syria"],"authors":[{"term_id":1290,"user_id":3561,"is_guest":0,"slug":"dr-musallam-abedtalas","display_name":"Dr. Musallam Abedtalas","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-20-at-23.42.30.jpeg","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-20-at-23.42.30.jpeg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14444","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3561"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14444"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14444\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14446,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14444\/revisions\/14446"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14445"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14444"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14444"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14444"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=14444"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}