{"id":14432,"date":"2026-04-19T11:35:48","date_gmt":"2026-04-19T09:35:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/?p=14432"},"modified":"2026-04-19T11:35:48","modified_gmt":"2026-04-19T09:35:48","slug":"forty-days-of-war-in-the-middle-east","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/forty-days-of-war-in-the-middle-east\/","title":{"rendered":"Forty Days of War in the Middle East"},"content":{"rendered":"

On February 1, 2026, four weeks before his death in an Israeli-American raid, the “Iranian Supreme Leader” Ali Khamenei stated, “The Americans must know that if they ignite a war, this time it will be a regional war.”<\/p>\n

If we look back at the forty days of war\u2014the first shot of which was that raid that killed Khamenei on February 28\u2014what he said became the scenario Iran followed in this war, a scenario it did not employ in the 12-day war last June. Tehran succeeded in this war in dictating its tempo, while the Americans and Israelis failed to determine that tempo through an American scenario that aimed to force Iran, via violent bombardment, to succumb to the three American demands required in the pre-war American-Iranian negotiations: handing over the 450 kilograms of enriched uranium while halting the nuclear program and enrichment, dismantling and stopping the ballistic missile program, and Iran abandoning its support for its regional proxies. There was an additional element for the Israelis regarding these three demands: to place the Iranian regime in a position, produced by the war, that would make it prone to collapse, whereas the Americans\u2014and they still do\u2014wanted a deal with the existing Iranian regime brought about by the fires of war.<\/p>\n

The scenario, which Khamenei alluded to and which was then applied after his killing, was based on confronting a superior enemy in a battle by focusing on its points of weakness, namely:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Disabling navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world\u2019s energy\u2014oil and liquefied gas\u2014passes, thereby raising global energy prices to levels that pressure Washington\u2014through the American domestic front and its allies in the major industrial countries that import energy\u2014to stop the war.<\/li>\n
  2. Directing most of Iran’s war power (ballistic missiles and drones) against the Gulf states, as they are an American weak point, first because they are the main producer of global energy, which affects prices; second, to show that America is incapable of protecting its allies; and third, to demonstrate that Iran holds the upper hand in the Gulf sphere.<\/li>\n
  3. Making Israel live in shelters via ballistic missiles and drones, even if most of them were intercepted in the air, and even if they were fewer in number than those launched by Iran at the Gulf states.<\/li>\n
  4. Mobilizing Iran’s major regional arm, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and making it engaged in this war, while hinting at the participation of its Iraqi and Yemeni proxies\u2014an option of arm-mobilization that Iran did not use in last year’s war.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Tehran succeeded in the “Forty Days War” in setting the tempo, while Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu failed to do so; it can be said that they were surprised by what Tehran did in this war and did not expect what transpired. It is likely that the “Caracas scenario,” which Washington applied two months ago against the Venezuelan president\u2014leading to hitting the head and uprooting it, thereby forcing the body of the Venezuelan regime to succumb to the American will\u2014had tempted Trump to repeat it in Tehran. There, they began by hitting the head in order to reach the surrender of the body, which did not happen, proving that Tehran is not Caracas 2.<\/p>\n

    In this regard, the claim\u2014even if repeated in Washington and elsewhere\u2014that Netanyahu dragged Trump into the war is not important. It is clear that the American “Deep State” (and the Pentagon is responsible for U.S. policy in the Middle East) has wanted, since October 7, 2023, to return and reverse Barack Obama’s policy of withdrawal from the Middle East. The Americans have become convinced by General de Gaulle’s assertion that the Middle East is the “heart of the world,” and that whoever controls it controls the world. The Middle East is the capital of global energy, and the “sole pole of the world” cannot continue to practice its unipolarity without controlling this region, thereby holding the key to the global energy spigot to control energy prices, manage global energy importers\u2014foremost among them the Chinese and Europeans\u2014and to compete with and contain the second capital of global energy, Russia.<\/p>\n

    Iran is the obstacle to this American plan, which is why it was struck by two wars within nine months, with rounds of negotiations taking place before and between them. Then, the Americans came to say to the Iranians in the Islamabad negotiations three days after the Forty Days War: “What is your opinion after all this fire?”<\/p>\n

    The Iranians\u2019 response to the Americans in the negotiations was: “But you did not succeed… and your Caracas-style plan has failed. Therefore, let us reach a middle ground.”<\/p>\n

    Here, Trump implies\u2014and this is what worries Tel Aviv, which has been clear and palpable to anyone following the Israeli press after the April 8 truce\u2014that he is prepared for a middle ground. However, it is unclear whether this will be like Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal with Khamenei (setting caps on the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for Washington turning a blind eye to Iranian regional expansion)\u2014a deal Trump described during the 2016 presidential campaign as the “worst deal in history” before withdrawing Washington’s signature from it in 2018\u2014or if it will be like the one discussed in the Wittkow-Araghchi negotiations last February. That deal offered (halting enrichment and the nuclear program and handing over enriched uranium in exchange for lifting sanctions on Iran) with ambiguity in Washington’s position regarding ballistic missiles and regional proxies. This was rejected by Iran, which offered to halt enrichment for a specific period while retaining the right to enrich and maintain nuclear facilities under a “peaceful program,” leading to the start of the war two days after those negotiations by the Americans and Israelis.<\/p>\n

    The matter that must be examined regarding the outcomes of the Pakistani capital\u2019s negotiations is: Did the balance of power between Washington and Tehran change after the war, considering that negotiations are a mirror of the balance of power? Consequently, how much has the position of the negotiators changed in the Islamabad negotiations compared to the Wittkow-Araghchi negotiations before the war?<\/p>\n

    The result that the war ended with governed the negotiations in the Pakistani capital and made them difficult to generate a result. The Iranian negotiator likely felt his position was better than it was two months ago, despite all that Washington and Tel Aviv did in terms of destroying Iranian military and economic capabilities. He holds the card of Washington’s fear of resuming a war that could lead to unprecedented and long-lasting rises in energy prices, should Iran strike Iranian energy facilities and Tehran respond by striking energy facilities in the Gulf. The Iranians also hold the card of Washington’s caution\u2014after the failure of its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan\u2014that any occupation of Iranian territory, whether the three islands of the Strait of Hormuz (Qeshm, Larak, and Hormuz), the coast of the strait, any Iranian land spot, or Kharg Island, would cause the Americans to drown in a long war with unknown endings and results. Furthermore, American public opinion is not inclined toward this, including Trump’s supporters in the new American right.<\/p>\n

    On the other hand, the American negotiator was aware that he was in a negotiating position that mirrors a war in which Washington and Tel Aviv could not deliver a knockout blow to Iran, according to the logic of boxing matches, nor win on points; rather, there is a pause that could lead to a settlement or to the resumption of war. It is clear that Trump does not want a war in the style of those fought by the United States in Afghanistan (2001-2021) and Iraq (2003-2011). The recent war proved to him that Khamenei\u2019s Tehran\u2014and post-Khamenei Tehran\u2014is not Maduro’s Caracas, nor is it Mullah Omar’s Kabul or Saddam Hussein’s Baghdad, both of which fell easily before the American military, even if what followed was very painful and a failure for the Americans. This is with the caveat that the Americans wanted the recent war to force the Iranian regime into a settlement they impose, and did not seek to topple the regime for fear of the regional chaos that would result from the Iranian fragmentation following the regime’s collapse, unlike what the Israelis wanted from the war.<\/p>\n

    The question now is: Does Trump\u2019s imposition of a blockade on Iranian ports after the Islamabad negotiations\u2014including the Strait of Hormuz, which was a major Iranian pressure card during the days of the war\u2014represent an attempt by him to improve the American terms without war in upcoming negotiations, and to strip Iran of a power card, despite all potential repercussions on oil prices? Or will the American move, which is confusing to Tehran, lead Iran to take the initiative to flip the table by reigniting the war?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    On February 1, 2026, four weeks before his death in an Israeli-American raid, the “Iranian Supreme Leader” Ali Khamenei stated, “The Americans must know that if they ignite a war, this time it will be a regional war.” If we look back at the forty days of war\u2014the first shot of which was that raid […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1359,"featured_media":14433,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[566,57,724,1292,40],"ppma_author":[962],"class_list":["post-14432","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-donald-trump","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-strait-of-hormuz","tag-syria"],"authors":[{"term_id":962,"user_id":1359,"is_guest":0,"slug":"mohammad-sayed-rassas","display_name":"Mohammad Sayed Rassas","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/WhatsApp-Image-2024-10-09-at-15.30.05-e1728481060869.jpeg","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/WhatsApp-Image-2024-10-09-at-15.30.05-e1728481060869.jpeg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14432","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1359"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14432"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14432\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14434,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14432\/revisions\/14434"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14433"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14432"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14432"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14432"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=14432"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}