March 2026 was not merely another month in the calendar of conflicts between the United States and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other. Rather, it represented a “zero moment” in regional history, a “historical clash of wills,” and a “radical geopolitical surgery” aimed at reshaping the region. The transition from “containment” to “existential war” was not a fleeting escalation but a change in the very ontology of the conflict itself; the objective was no longer to apply pressure to improve negotiating terms, but to force Iran to fight “within its own walls” for the first time in decades. The paradox here is that what is collapsing is not only the “Axis of Resistance,” but the very possibility of “resistance” itself existing as a form of political being.<\/p>\n
First: “Naked Power” and the “Coercive Security Order”<\/strong><\/p>\n The American-Israeli alliance at this stage relies on a philosophy of “structural shock and awe.” This is achieved by targeting centers of Iranian sovereignty (the Supreme Leader, command headquarters) rather than merely destroying military capacity. The goal is to shatter the “prestige of the central state” to drive it toward coerced negotiations under the pressure of internal disintegration. This is an attempt to impose a new Pax Americana\u2014one based not on “spreading democracy” (as in Iraq 2003), but on the “nullification of regional ambitions” and even threatening the essential existence of Iran as an entity and a state.<\/p>\n What the region is witnessing is not a mere redistribution of roles, but an attempt to impose a “coercive normativity” that eliminates the concept of “revolutionary exceptionalism,” transforming geopolitics from a space of ideological struggle into a technical arena governed by the necessities of strict functional security.<\/p>\n Second: The Dilemma of “National Nationalism”<\/strong><\/p>\n Tehran today faces a profound sociological predicament. While the new leadership (led by Qalibaf and Mojtaba Khamenei) attempts to summon the Persian national spirit to confront “external aggression,” this discourse collides with the reality of strikes hitting the civilian depth. The ongoing conflict acts as a catalyst for a process of “forced sorting” within the Iranian elite. One faction sees the “Grand Bargain” (surrendering regional ambitions in exchange for regime preservation) as the only exit, while the “Guard” (IRGC) faction believes that retreating now constitutes total political suicide. This internal dilemma may pose a greater threat to the regime’s stability than the military strikes themselves. Behind the scenes, the possibility of an internally brokered “deal” under international auspices emerges, wherein factions of the Revolutionary Guard trade their regional interventions and nuclear ambitions for their survival as an economic and security power.<\/p>\n This sorting reflects a fracture in the “collective imaginary” that long linked the physical survival of the regime to geopolitical expansion. The elite now find themselves before a historical reckoning: either retreat toward the “Nation-State” within its narrow borders or risk extinction under the weight of pressure that no longer distinguishes between the military and the civilian.<\/p>\n Third: The Energy Weapon<\/strong><\/p>\n Tehran attempted to target energy transit routes\u2014not merely as a reaction, but as an attempt to draw global powers (specifically China and Europe) into pressuring Washington to halt the war for fear of a supply chain collapse. However, the weapon recoiled. Why? Because targeting oil facilities did not force China and Europe to demand a ceasefire; instead, it accelerated the formation of an “international coalition for the protection of waterways.” Here, this energy strategy transformed into an economic burden, causing Iran to lose its last “allies” in Beijing and New Delhi, as these powers cannot tolerate the disruption of global energy flows.<\/p>\n More profoundly: there is a hidden struggle over “alternative corridors.” The war is accelerating the search for trade routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz, potentially altering the economic map of the Gulf and Iraq in the long term. This means Iran risks losing not only the current battle but the “structural foundation” of its resources and future existence, even if the regime or its policies were to change. It fights today with a weapon turned toward its own chest, effectively killing the “tomorrow” it was betting on. This is political suicide: not dying in battle, but killing the conditions that make the battle meaningful.<\/p>\n Fourth: Arab Balances<\/strong><\/p>\n Arab capitals in the Gulf find themselves at the heart of the “redrawing of maps.” While most remain committed to security agreements with Washington, they are transitioning from a “doctrinal alliance” with the West to a “functional alliance” based on momentary bargaining. They negotiate with Washington over the “price of protection”\u2014not only with money, but with guarantees against sliding into a comprehensive regional war that destroys infrastructure. The preferred or requested guarantee, from a Gulf and regional perspective, may be: the continuation and acceleration of the war until the regime in Tehran is weakened.<\/p>\n However, the Arab-Gulf vision (and Turkey) realizes that defeating Iran militarily may create a dangerous “strategic vacuum” if it is not filled by a viable “state” project capable of stability. The real danger lies not in the war itself, but in the “day after,” which may witness new border disputes or the rise of trans-national or trans-border movements feeding on the rubble of war. Consequently, there is a state of “double consciousness” or “desire-fear” regarding current events\u2014though the Gulf desire to weaken Iran is stronger than the fears. But the question remains: What if the “traditional Arab role” itself was part of the problem? And what if what the Arabs fear is not the marginalization of their role, but the revelation that their role never existed in the first place?<\/p>\n Fifth: The Transformation of Iran<\/strong><\/p>\n The American conditions being discussed are not merely a list of demands to stop the war. Rather, they are a program to transform Iran from a “trans-national revolution” into a “disciplined state.” Trump insists on “no enrichment,” the surrender of enriched stockpiles, and a multi-year halt to the missile program. Simultaneously, there is talk of “major points of agreement” with “reasonable” Iranian figures (bypassing the new Supreme Leader directly).<\/p>\n This is the deep geopolitical dimension: The Iranian Revolution was, in essence, an attempt to transcend the logic of the nation-state toward an Islamic revolutionary project. But this project is now being transformed, in the moment of its defeat, into just another state. Iran is not only being defeated militarily; it is being defeated ontologically: it is being stripped of its uniqueness as an \u201cexception.”<\/p>\n Here lies “ontological defeat” in its ultimate form; the “revolutionary actor” is forced to admit that its meta-political tools are no longer valid against the “harsh realism” imposed by military technology and naked power balances, transforming it from a “cause” into a mere “file” on the international negotiating table.<\/p>\n Sixth: The Philosophy of “Exiting Geography”<\/strong><\/p>\n March 2026 is not just a war; it is a “laboratory” for the concept of power in the 21st century. The region is bidding farewell not only to a regional order, but to the illusions of “fragile stability,” “security by proxy,” and “regional empire.” The unspoken element in everything unfolding is the redrawing of the “regional social contract.” The great paradox is that the old contract was always based on “objective consensus” and the acceptance of “regional constraints” and “friction zones” overlapping with “zones of harmony.” What is happening now is that this has become nearly impossible.<\/p>\n National security no longer resides in ballistic missiles, armed ideologies, or armed proxies; it lies in the capacity for economic resilience, internal legitimacy, and adaptation to the “harsh realism” now being written in the skies and geography of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf, and the world. “Exiting geography”\u2014which does not apply to Iran alone\u2014means stripping regional powers of their traditional margins for maneuver (such as proxies and political vacuums) and forcibly returning them to their national borders. At this moment, the interior becomes exposed to direct international pressure following the fall of external shields. Ideological and military tools recede, leaving the state with no “buffers” other than its national legitimacy and social cohesion (especially in multi-ethnic and multi-national societies) as the final line of defense capable of absorbing the shock and preventing total structural collapse.<\/p>\n Seventh: The Moment of “The Great Change”<\/strong><\/p>\n The region is witnessing a “Great Change” in the balance of power that had seemingly stabilized since the invasion of Iraq. The future will be written by those who possess the ability to manage the challenges and opportunities of the “new regional order” currently being born from the explosions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf.<\/p>\n We are facing a moment of “great liquidity” that will end with the surpassing of the “Iranian phenomenon” as we knew it, yet without the ability to escape the constraints of the new regional power structure. The question is not: What will happen after the war? Rather: How do we read the war itself as the “day after” of what we thought was stability? What is the next step after Iran, and how will regional states and actors interpret the post-war “regional system”? What are the medium and long-term repercussions of all this?<\/p>\n What is occurring in the American-Israeli war on Iran is not merely a military round, but a “structural adjustment moment”\u2014as is repeatedly noted\u2014for the balance of power in the Middle East. But this “structural adjustment”\u2014a term from the IMF lexicon\u2014tells us that what is happening is a “restructuring of debt”: the debt of influence, the debt of security, and the debt of political existence itself.<\/p>\n Adaptation, in the end, is not a virtue. Adaptation is the admission that you no longer possess the power to change the conditions, but only to “acclimatize” to them. This is the true meaning of this moment: what is happening is not the “end of history,” but the “end of the belief” that history can be made through mere defiance and stubbornness. The rest\u2014as \u017di\u017eek says\u2014is just ideology.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" March 2026 was not merely another month in the calendar of conflicts between the United States and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other. Rather, it represented a “zero moment” in regional history, a “historical clash of wills,” and a “radical geopolitical surgery” aimed at reshaping the region. The transition from “containment” to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3441,"featured_media":14376,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[57,1212,1062],"ppma_author":[1206],"class_list":["post-14375","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-iran","tag-middle-east","tag-u-s"],"authors":[{"term_id":1206,"user_id":3441,"is_guest":0,"slug":"akil-said-mahfoud","display_name":"Akil Said Mahfoud","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/01\/WhatsApp-Image-2025-01-08-at-11.06.29.jpeg","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/01\/WhatsApp-Image-2025-01-08-at-11.06.29.jpeg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14375","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3441"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14375"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14375\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14378,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14375\/revisions\/14378"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14376"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14375"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14375"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14375"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=14375"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}