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<\/p>\nBy Iranian Studies Unit<\/p>\n
The ongoing trajectory of the war on Iran reveals a divergence in objectives between Washington and Tel Aviv, despite their engagement in an unprecedented joint war targeting the Iranian regime. The U.S. administration declares that its priority is centered on destroying ballistic missile launch capabilities, weakening their production, targeting naval assets, and preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Meanwhile, American statements themselves indicate that Israel focuses more significantly on the Iranian leadership and decision-making centers, alongside repeated Israeli discourse regarding the removal of “existential threats” and continued pressure on the regime’s infrastructure. Thus, the United States appears more committed to specific, declared military goals, while Israel operates within a broader ceiling that targets the head of the regime and its tools of survival.<\/p>\n
The discrepancy in the language of U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding Israel’s decision to attack the Iranian Pars field represents the most prominent difference of opinion between the two leaders since the beginning of the war. Trump expressed his opposition to this targeting, having previously voiced his rejection of Israeli strikes on energy facilities in Tehran. This indicates that the target bank for both parties, the American and the Israeli, is not unified and is not subject to consensus.<\/p>\n
The Israeli attack on the “South Pars” gas field prompted Iran to retaliate by targeting energy infrastructure in other Middle Eastern countries. The Iranian strikes led to a further spike in already high global energy prices and motivated Gulf allies to demand that Trump rein in Netanyahu.<\/p>\n
According to an analysis by the Associated Press dated March 20, the repercussions of the strike have left both Trump and Netanyahu facing questions about whether they are fully aligned in managing the war, which began as a closely coordinated joint assault on Iran. The agency adds that the emergence of this divergence\u2014or at least what appears to be such\u2014between the two leaders could shape the balance of the conflict and any potential end to it.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Map of the extent of the Pars gas field in the Gulf | AFP<\/em><\/p>\n In this context, it appears that Washington limits its declared goals to destroying Iran\u2019s tools of military power. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, stated in a Congressional hearing on March 18 that the U.S. President focused on ballistic missile launch capabilities, production capacities, and the navy, while Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth emphasized that American objectives also include preventing Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon. In contrast, Israeli statements and the focus of operations reflect a different path; Gabbard reported that Israel focuses on the Iranian leadership, while Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar stated that the war will continue until the removal of what he described as “existential threats.” Thus, the difference between the two parties does not only concern the existence of a common goal but also the nature and limits of that goal: the United States declares the targeting of Iranian military capabilities, while Israel moves toward the Iranian leadership and the broader threat structure. The official American logic is: reducing the Iranian military threat, not declaring regime change as a direct goal.<\/p>\n As for the Israeli goal, as evident from the statements of Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, and from Gabbard’s own description of the operations, it is broader than that.<\/p>\n Netanyahu stated on February 28 that Israel would work to “create the conditions” for Iranians to free themselves from “tyranny,” later returning on March 7 to say: “We do not seek to divide Iran, but to liberate it.” On March 17, he spoke of continuing pressure on the Iranian regime through direct and indirect means.<\/p>\n Based on the content of these positions, Israel’s goals transcend striking missiles and facilities, pointing toward targeting the leadership structure and the regime’s political capacity, while leaving the door open for internal change as a desired outcome.<\/p>\n Furthermore, Israel defines its goals in broader terms, such as removing “existential threats.” Gideon Sa’ar said the war would continue until all objectives are achieved, including the removal of these threats, while Reuters quoted Netanyahu as focusing on weakening the Iranian political and military leadership, while acknowledging that regime change itself is not guaranteed and that “it must come from within.” This means that Israel does not officially declare that toppling the regime is a direct and decisive goal, but it moves militarily and politically toward weakening it and creating an environment that might produce that result, because if it were to declare it as a goal, its ability to achieve it is not guaranteed and seems far-fetched.<\/p>\n Washington attempts to maintain certain political boundaries for the war, even if the operations are very extensive. Trump’s statements sometimes exceed the political limits of the war, while Israel seems less committed to these limits in its rhetoric because its definition of “existential threat” is loose and practically includes the leadership, the missile and nuclear programs, and the regional influence network combined.<\/p>\n The Losers and the Sole Winner<\/strong><\/p>\n In an analysis published by Reuters on March 19, titled: The War with Iran Boosts Netanyahu’s Position and Harms Trump and the Gulf States, it stated:<\/p>\n If the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran were to end tomorrow, one truth is already clear: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will emerge stronger than ever, while President Donald Trump will find himself facing the shock that hit global markets and Gulf allies who bore the heaviest costs.<\/p>\n For Netanyahu, analysts say the war has redrawn the political map in Israel on his own terms; it shifted attention away from Gaza and directed it toward Iran, where national consensus is at its strongest and his security and economic credentials have a greater impact.<\/p>\n For Trump, the opposite is true. The war has left him trapped in a conflict with no clear exit, exposed his Arab allies in the Gulf to escalating risks, and undermined the economic arguments and promises that supported his return to office.<\/p>\n “There is a clear winner and a clear loser. Netanyahu is the main winner by a large margin. He has demonstrated Israel’s military competence. The Gulf states are the biggest losers by a large margin,” said Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. negotiator on Middle East issues.<\/p>\n Miller adds that for Trump, there is no exit that allows him to declare victory and withdraw. Iranian affairs expert Karim Sadjadpour noted that Trump, who demanded Iran’s unconditional surrender, expected to find an “Iranian Delcy Rodr\u00edguez,” in the Venezuelan style, but instead “found an Iranian Kim Jong Un,” citing the challenge represented by the North Korean model.<\/p>\n Within the same Reuters analysis, Natan Sachs, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, says that the war against Iran is widely viewed in Israel as a necessary war rather than a war of choice, unlike in Washington. Sachs added, “Even if regime change does not occur, weakening Iran and the axis (of armed groups) it leads represents a major goal for Netanyahu.”<\/p>\n The Geography of War<\/strong><\/p>\n Israeli officials say the air war has been generally divided, with Israel focusing on western and northern Iran, attacking ballistic missile sites and nuclear sites, while the United States focuses on the east and south, including the Strait of Hormuz, to weaken Iranian naval capabilities.<\/p>\n The officials add that Israel led the operations to kill senior Iranian leaders, including the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, and Intelligence Minister Ismail Khatib. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that he and Netanyahu authorized the military to strike any high-ranking Iranian official who can be identified, without the need for additional approval.<\/p>\n Three Options Before Trump<\/strong><\/p>\n However, these gains have not brought the war closer to its end. Trump is left with only three bad options: prolonging the strikes, declaring victory with the hope that Tehran will back down, or sharp escalation.<\/p>\n U.S. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard told Congress that although the Iranian government has been weakened since the start of the war, it remains alive and intact, and Tehran and its proxies are still capable of attacking U.S. and allied interests throughout the Middle East.<\/p>\n Trump\u2019s apparent miscalculation resonates strongly in the Gulf. As Iran launches missiles and drones at commercial centers and closes the Strait of Hormuz\u2014the lifeline for the passage of one-fifth of global oil production\u2014analysts say the danger is that the Gulf states will become the biggest victims.<\/p>\n Miller, who is also a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: “The shared threat they (the Arab Gulf states) see now is the future of Gulf security and stability, nothing less. The idea that the Gulf represents the future of the region is now at stake, and with it, the Gulf’s vision of itself.”<\/p>\n Analysts say Israel may be more prepared than the United States to accept instability in Iran, as it sees that the regional repercussions it will face will be much lower, especially after weakening Iran’s proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, over the past three years.<\/p>\n At the same time, Washington and its partners in the Gulf are more exposed to attacks on energy infrastructure that lead to rising oil prices and shipping disruptions.<\/p>\n Assaf Orion, a former head of strategy in the Israeli military, said regional countries are wondering whether Israel is seeking to create chaos in Iran, adding that Israel would be less affected by this disruption than its neighbors or Washington.<\/p>\n The conclusion is that the two allies, in essence, have different perceptions of risk; Israel sees Iran as a potential existential threat, while Washington focuses more on avoiding a protracted war that could impose heavy economic costs and damage alliances.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" By Iranian Studies Unit The ongoing trajectory of the war on Iran reveals a divergence in objectives between Washington and Tel Aviv, despite their engagement in an unprecedented joint war targeting the Iranian regime. The U.S. administration declares that its priority is centered on destroying ballistic missile launch capabilities, weakening their production, targeting naval assets, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3550,"featured_media":14352,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[566,57,724,965,964],"ppma_author":[1273],"class_list":["post-14350","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-donald-trump","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-nethanyahu","tag-united-states"],"authors":[{"term_id":1273,"user_id":3550,"is_guest":0,"slug":"iranian-studies-unit","display_name":"Iranian Studies Unit","avatar_url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/572c726a6d85e695d5b44a66efdae94702cfe8349e666b0bdfb457154618bebe?s=96&d=mm&r=g","0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14350","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3550"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14350"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14350\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14353,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14350\/revisions\/14353"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14352"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14350"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14350"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14350"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=14350"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}