The battles moved swiftly since Ankara and Damascus declared war on the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods in Aleppo on January 6th. This followed the conclusion of Israeli-Syrian talks in Paris (January 5\u20136), held under American sponsorship and with close Turkish monitoring to adjust the results in favor of its interests. The outcomes of these talks produced a new framework for the division of labor between Ankara and Tel Aviv, reshaping regional spheres of influence within Syria according to an American will. This vision aims to transform the Syrian functional role into a pressure tool against Iran on Syria\u2019s two flanks: Hezbollah in Lebanon to the west, and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq to the east.<\/p>\n
Within this atmosphere of regional role-sharing, Tel Aviv gained the upper hand over a fluid and currently undefined “security zone” encompassing the three southern Syrian provinces up to the outskirts of Damascus. Meanwhile, Turkey retained the territory it occupied and expanded west of the Euphrates River. However, the most significant shift came with the expansion of Damascus\u2019s control east of the Euphrates. This occurred after the initial agreement\u2014which stipulated the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from Deir Hafer and Maskanah on the western bank of the river\u2014was superseded. A profound shift appears to have altered the general map of influence, as the SDF vacated Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor provinces following a brief war of attrition that paved the way for an organized withdrawal toward Hasakah and Kobani.<\/p>\n
This eastward expansion seems to complete the broad outlines drawn in Paris. In the wider context, American threats of war, driven by an Israeli desire to eliminate the Iranian regime, cannot be fulfilled without a Syrian role. Here, activating Damascus\u2019s functional role becomes necessary\u2014specifically the deployment of Ministry of Defense factions, supported by tribal forces and a state of lawlessness involving ISIS elements along the border with Iraq. Such a scenario would force the Iraqi PMF to shift priorities from bolstering Iranian authority in the east to protecting Iraq\u2019s western borders, which is ultimately what occurred. However, this new Syrian role would not have been possible without Turkish acceptance of Damascus distracting Iran in Iraq. Ankara has long defended Iran to prevent a military strike that could topple its regime, even attempting to host talks between Washington and Tehran. However, Tehran chose Oman for these talks to ensure they remained distant from “regional power influence,” suggesting that Iran has lost some confidence in the Turkish role.<\/p>\n
Theoretically, what occurred in northeastern Syria cannot be isolated from the broader regional picture. This necessitates a comprehensive look at the sequence of events that began on January 4th in Damascus, during a negotiation round between the SDF and the Transitional Government. The session nearly resulted in an agreement to integrate the SDF\u2014as verbally agreed upon in October 2025\u2014had a “third party” not intervened to postpone the signing until January 9th, after the return from Paris and a clear understanding of the new agreements.<\/p>\n
One question following the takeover of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh\u2014engineered by Turkish intelligence and the military alongside loyal factions within the Syrian Ministry of Defense\u2014was where the war would stop following the SDF withdrawal from Deir Hafer and Maskanah. There was no clear answer amid the fluid military situation and the advance of Ministry of Defense factions toward Tabqa and Raqqa. Meetings sponsored by Erbil suggested that the U.S. representative in Syria, Thomas Brack, supported an SDF withdrawal from all Arab-majority areas. These suspicions were confirmed with the signing of the January 18 agreement, which established separation lines along ethnic lines. In practice, Kurdish-majority areas (Hasakah and Kobani) remained under SDF control, suggesting that recent Washington efforts aimed to insulate Syrian Kurds from the broader conflict within and over Syria. Consequently, Kurdish nationalist sentiments surged, backed by a wave of popular support across Kurdish cities and the diaspora in Europe.<\/p>\n
In most communications between U.S. officials and Damascus, and through comments from congressional leaders, it became clear that the American path favors protecting the Kurds over maintaining the alliance with the SDF for the sole purpose of fighting ISIS. Under these visions, the SDF\u2014or what will later be termed as brigades integrated into the Ministry of Defense\u2014became the force entrusted with maintaining stability in Kurdish-majority areas. To this end, the Transitional President issued Decree No. 13 of 2026, recognizing the Kurdish presence and attempting to frame Kurdish cultural and educational rights as part of a political solution, with verbal promises to include the decree in the permanent Syrian constitution.<\/p>\n
From Damascus\u2019s perspective, the “SDF threat” to Syrian authority has been neutralized. There is no longer a viable “armed” alternative to central authority following the end of the joint Kurdish-Arab military alliance. Although the SDF did not present itself as an alternative to the state, the presence of tens of thousands of fighters east of the Euphrates was seen by both Damascus and Ankara as a constant threat. Following recent developments, the SDF has become a local guard for the Kurdish and mixed Kurdish-Arab regions (referred to in the January 18 agreement as the “special status” of Hasakah). From the perspective of the SDF and Kurdish forces, adapting to these new realities\u2014appointing a Kurdish governor for Hasakah and integrating military and security formations into the Ministries of Defense and Interior\u2014serves to protect Syrian Kurds from open warfare while waiting to see how events in Syria and the region settle amidst U.S. threats against Iran.<\/p>\n
In its near-final form, the SDF has transformed from a force with an Arab majority into one with an overwhelming Kurdish majority. This shift is not a retreat from the idea of containing ethnic groups within a military and administrative framework; rather, it is a situation crafted by the United States via Thomas Brack, with Ankara and Damascus following suit. The big question remains: Is Turkey happy to be rid of the “multi-ethnic” SDF ghost, or has it fallen into a trap by allowing a force with a dominant Kurdish character on its southern border? There is no definitive answer, but Turkey, which mobilized the “Syrian Army” starting with the Aleppo moment, may now be haunted by a new obsession: a silent decentralized entity (unannounced and not labeled as “autonomy”) built on an agreement between the SDF and Damascus, under American sponsorship, under the guise of Kurdish “specificity.”<\/p>\n
It appears Ankara will accept this new Kurdish reality to save its domestic peace process with the PKK and Kurds in Turkey, avoiding backing “all Kurds” into a corner. This suggests that the level of Kurdish rights in Syria might become the prototype for Kurdish rights in Turkey. Thus, Ankara worked to downsize Kurdish aspirations for political statehood in Syria and participated in\u2014or perhaps even drafted\u2014Decree 13. In the Turkish view, the Kurdish issue in Syria, Iraq, and Iran is effectively a Turkish issue as well.<\/p>\n
In any case, the mood in Damascus, Ankara, Washington, and Hasakah leans toward accepting partial solutions for now. The implementation of the recent agreements between Damascus and the SDF will remain the primary determinant of the situation and the ability of local Syrian parties to cooperate through self-restraint. From a high-level view, this appears to be an international imposition of a “no victor, no vanquished” formula, or at worst, a freezing of the conflict. The American priority lies in maintaining pressure on Iran and preventing regional parties, primarily Turkey, from distracting Washington from its main goal. In this sense, all parties must freeze the conflict that began with the “Paris moment” and work on building the lost trust between the SDF and Damascus to facilitate military and administrative integration. Otherwise, what has been achieved through war and agreement may turn out to be merely a truce masking an even more violent conflict.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The battles moved swiftly since Ankara and Damascus declared war on the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods in Aleppo on January 6th. This followed the conclusion of Israeli-Syrian talks in Paris (January 5\u20136), held under American sponsorship and with close Turkish monitoring to adjust the results in favor of its interests. The outcomes of these […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":266,"featured_media":14301,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[1031,1254,724,87,36,964],"ppma_author":[506],"class_list":["post-14300","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-ahmed-al-sharaa","tag-damascus-interim-government","tag-israel","tag-syrian-democratic-forces","tag-turkey","tag-united-states"],"authors":[{"term_id":506,"user_id":266,"is_guest":0,"slug":"shoresh-darwish","display_name":"Shoresh Darwish","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/Shoresh-3.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/Shoresh-3.jpg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14300","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/266"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14300"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14300\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14302,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14300\/revisions\/14302"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14301"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14300"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14300"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14300"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=14300"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}