{"id":14262,"date":"2026-01-03T10:35:24","date_gmt":"2026-01-03T09:35:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/?p=14262"},"modified":"2026-01-03T10:37:57","modified_gmt":"2026-01-03T09:37:57","slug":"turkeys-positioning-strategy-and-the-administration-of-the-iranian-axis-remnants","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/turkeys-positioning-strategy-and-the-administration-of-the-iranian-axis-remnants\/","title":{"rendered":"Turkey\u2019s Positioning Strategy and the Administration of the \u201cIranian Axis Remnants\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>By Turkish Studies Unit <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Driven by internal crises and regional vacuums, Turkey is moving toward adopting a strategy of &#8220;Flexible Hegemony&#8221;in the Middle East. Its goal is no longer regime change through direct intervention, but rather transforming into an indispensable &#8220;mediating and administrative power.&#8221; This strategy relies on containing and repurposing the tools of eroding Iranian influence (such as Hezbollah and Syrian factions) and converting them into &#8220;functional geopolitical assets&#8221; in its possession. The central objective is to create a new &#8220;Balance of Threat&#8221; and a &#8220;controlled strategic ambiguity&#8221; that achieves two goals for Ankara:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Preventing Israel from unilaterally shaping the emerging regional order.<\/li>\n<li>Imposing Turkey as a necessary mediator and arbiter, enabling it to bypass its economic crises by converting them into geopolitical gains.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This article provides an anatomy of this emerging strategy, starting from its core motives (existential economics, managing the Iranian collapse, and deterrence by proxy), through its implementation mechanisms via &#8220;pragmatic agency&#8221; with non-state actors, and reaching its primary test in Syria. It also analyzes the structural challenges threatening it (Turkey\u2019s domestic front, the minorities dilemma, tensions with NATO) and, finally, maps out potential scenarios for its fate\u2014ranging from success and strained management to collision and retreat.<\/p>\n<p>Turkey&#8217;s success in this strategy is contingent upon its ability to manage two fundamental contradictions: the first is internal (between the ambition of the project and its economic\/political costs), and the second is external (between utilizing NATO membership as a shield and pursuing policies that undermine Western interests). Failure to manage either could turn &#8220;flexible hegemony&#8221; into a strategic loss.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Fundamental Assumptions<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Economic Pressures: Continued structural economic pressure on Turkey acts as a primary containment or regulatory factor for its foreign policy.<\/li>\n<li>The continued relative decline of direct Iranian influence in the arabic Levant, though Tehran retains a relative capacity to maneuver through proxies (despite few current indicators in this regard).<\/li>\n<li>No foreseeable shift in US strategic priorities (competition with Russia) that would diminish Turkey&#8217;s value as an ally.<\/li>\n<li>Israel appears cautious in facing threats from non-state actors, preferring indirect solutions in its confrontation with Turkey\u2014treating &#8220;symptoms&#8221; (Turkish proxies in Syria) rather than the &#8220;source of threat&#8221; (Turkey itself).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Pivotal Actors in the Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The Main Actor (The Driver): Turkey (Political leadership, security establishment, economic considerations).<\/li>\n<li>Actors Subject to Management (The Tools): Hezbollah, Turkish-aligned Syrian factions.<\/li>\n<li>Competitors\/Targeted Actors: Israel, Iran (as a partner\/competitor).<\/li>\n<li>The Rational\/Restraining Actors: The United States and NATO, Russia.<\/li>\n<li>Affected Actors\/Bargaining Chips: Syrian minorities (Kurds, Alawites, Druze, and Christians), the Syrian regime, and Arab states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Tipping Points and Early Warning Indicators<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Critical Turkish Internal Indicator: A sharp escalation in the economic crisis (currency collapse, social unrest) may force the leadership into a tactical retreat or an external adventure to divert attention.<\/li>\n<li>Dangerous Regional Indicator: Any major escalation between Hezbollah (under the umbrella of Turkish-Iranian understandings) and Israel resulting in strategic damage to Israel could push Tel Aviv to target Turkish infrastructure in Syria directly.<\/li>\n<li>Potential International Indicator: New US or European legislation imposing direct sanctions on Turkish entities linked to the management of these militias, paralyzing the financial side of the strategy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The Turkish role is no longer limited to regime change or direct military intervention; it has moved to a more complex stage: attempting &#8220;Flexible Hegemony&#8221; by containing and managing the remnants of collapsed Iranian influence. Ankara adopts a &#8220;Balance of Threat&#8221; strategy by transforming Iran&#8217;s traditional tools (Hezbollah) into functional pressure cards within its geopolitical portfolio.<\/p>\n<p>The dual goal is:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>to prevent Israel from unilaterally redrawing regional maps<\/li>\n<li>to fill the strategic vacuum through a self-imposed mediation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This creates a state of &#8220;controlled geopolitical ambiguity&#8221; through which Turkey protects its interests and pass its internal crises.<\/p>\n<p>This material examines the mechanisms of this transformation, its internal and external drivers, potential reactions, and the associated strategic scenarios. It posits that Turkey\u2019s success is contingent upon its ability to balance internal challenges with the risks arising from the collision of interests among key international and regional powers.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><strong>I &#8211; Turkish Motives<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>This fundamental Turkish shift did not emerge merely from a regional vacuum; rather, it is the outcome of the interaction between three interconnected drivers:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>The Existential-Economic Motive (Survival through Expansion):<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Turkey faces structural economic crises (inflation, deficits, and declining foreign exchange reserves) alongside social challenges. This ambitious regional project is utilized as a tool to achieve an &#8216;external transfer&#8217; of the domestic crisis, by presenting political achievements and securing potential economic gains (markets, transport routes, and energy resources). It is an attempt to transform a potential economic retreat into a geopolitical leap.<\/p>\n<ol start=\"2\">\n<li>The Geopolitical Motive (Managing Iranian Collapse):<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Ankara has realized that a managed collapse of Iranian influence is more beneficial than a chaotic one, which could create a vacuum filled by Israel or reproduce further conflicts. Turkey is playing the role of a &#8216;strategic liquidator&#8217; or a &#8216;geopolitical guardian&#8217; of Iran\u2019s regional assets, capitalizing on Tehran\u2019s urgent need for a political and economic &#8216;lung&#8217; to alleviate its isolation.<\/p>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li>The Ideological-Security Motive (Deterrence via Proxy):<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The Turkish-Iranian competition in Syria has shifted from an existential struggle into a form of &#8216;compulsory defensive integration.&#8217; Despite their differences, both countries face what is perceived as a &#8216;shared existential threat&#8217; from absolute Israeli hegemony and the emergence of the Kurdish role. Syria, no longer a purely Iranian corridor, has become a &#8216;grand bargaining arena&#8217; managed by Ankara to achieve this deterrence, while ensuring this does not conflict with the long-term Syrian arrangements that Turkey seeks to lead.&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p><strong>II &#8211; Implementation Mechanism:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Ankara is re-engineering its relations with non-state actors according to a strict pragmatic contract that transcends ideology in favor of mutual benefit:<\/p>\n<p>Hezbollah: From &#8220;Resistance&#8221; to an &#8220;Attrition Asset&#8221;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Political Cover vs. Tactical Discipline: Turkey provides political and diplomatic cover aimed at preventing or containing the collapse of Hezbollah. In return, the party adheres (under an organized consensus with Iran) to Ankara\u2019s approach, which balances escalation and de-escalation toward Israel. Consequently, Hezbollah is repositioned as a &#8220;functional leverage card&#8221; under a relative Turkish umbrella, with Iranian green light as a condition for continuity.<\/li>\n<li>The Geographic Tool: The party is employed to create &#8220;strategic ambiguity&#8221; that unsettles Israel on its northern border and in the Eastern Mediterranean. This increases the cost of any large-scale Israeli military action and positions Turkey as the party holding the &#8220;key&#8221; to escalation.<\/li>\n<li>Flexible Hegemony Militias: Turkish-aligned Syrian factions are transforming from tools of war into regional &#8220;order-keeping forces.&#8221; Their new role is to consolidate the Turkish presence in Idlib and northern Syria, establish a new demographic reality, and exert pressure on other parties (the Regime and the Kurds), while ensuring they do not spiral out of control to avoid becoming a burden on Turkish-Western relations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>III \u2013 The Testing Ground: Syria as a &#8220;Laboratory for Flexible Hegemony&#8221;<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Syria has become the primary arena for implementing this strategy:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The Syrian Regime (The Present-Absentee): The regime (al-Sharaa) deals with this Turkish role as an established reality and may accept it as a &#8220;lesser evil&#8221; compared to other options (such as Israeli expansion or total collapse). At a later stage, Damascus itself might become a bargaining chip between Ankara and Tehran (though this remains a mere possibility with no current indicators to support it).<\/li>\n<li>The Syrian Kurds (The Western Friction Point): The Kurds, the Autonomous Administration, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remain the greatest challenge to Turkish strategy, as it places Ankara in direct confrontation with its NATO ally (the United States), which supports the SDF. Managing this file without a direct explosion is a decisive test of Turkey\u2019s maneuvering capabilities.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>IV \u2013 Structural Challenges and Risks: The Limits of Flexible Hegemony<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The Turkish strategy faces risks that may reproduce the very chaos it seeks to manage:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The Turkish Internal Challenge: The economic crisis may exhaust Ankara&#8217;s ability to sustain such an ambitious and costly project. Furthermore, any shift in the internal balance of power between the military-security establishment and the political leadership could trigger unpredictable fluctuations in regional orientation.<\/li>\n<li>The Syrian Minorities Dilemma (The &#8220;Time Bomb&#8221; in Turkish Framing): The Turkish rise sparks existential fears among Alawites, Druze, Christians, and certainly the Kurds. Fear of a &#8220;radical sea&#8221; or &#8220;Neo-Ottomanism&#8221; might drive them to seek protection, ally with Israel, or search for an alternative international guarantor\u2014provided Israel offers sufficient signals and takes long-term trust-building measures.<\/li>\n<li>Clash with the NATO System: NATO membership acts as a protective shield for Turkish strategy in the short term, as Israel and the U.S. hesitate to strike targets under &#8220;Turkish cover&#8221; (Ankara-aligned armed factions). However, this fuels mounting Western resentment that could reach a tipping point, leading to sanctions (such as applying the Caesar Act or anti-terrorism laws to Turkish-backed factions), potentially paralyzing or straining the strategy.<\/li>\n<li>The Risk of &#8220;Proxy Defiance&#8221;: Factions\u2014or even Hezbollah\u2014might act independently according to local agendas or embroil Turkey in uncalculated conflicts with international forces in Syria. This could demote Turkey from the position of &#8220;Manager&#8221; to that of a &#8220;Direct Party&#8221; in the conflict (though this remains a speculative assessment requiring further scrutiny).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>V \u2013 The Struggle to Engineer a New Order<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Iran, Partnership as a Survival Strategy:<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Tehran accepts this role as a transitional phase for survival, yet it maintains deep ties with its proxies (Hezbollah) and attempts to secure a foothold on the coast (albeit without success so far) as an option for a future return. This relationship remains susceptible to evolving into a &#8220;shadow conflict&#8221; over proxy control and influence within the Syrian arena.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Israel, From Military Superiority to Geopolitical Challenge:<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Israel recognizes that the threat has shifted from direct missiles to &#8220;controlled chaos,&#8221; which limits its options and increases operational costs. Israel may respond by strengthening its alliance with Greece and Cyprus (in gas and military cooperation\u2014recently evident), pressuring Washington to contain Turkey, and potentially targeting Ankara-aligned factions (a move highly sought after by Syrian minorities and components, carrying low diplomatic and political costs).<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The United States and NATO, The Dilemma of a Rogue Ally:<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Washington faces a true dilemma: Turkey is an indispensable strategic NATO ally according to U.S. perceptions and strategies! However, it adopts policies that undermine American interests (rapprochement with Russia, S-400 acquisition, and now managing militias hostile to Israel). The American decision will be governed by balancing overlapping priorities: containing Iran, supporting Israel, competing with Russia, and determining Turkey&#8217;s position in this equation. This point requires further scrutiny or unconventional thinking.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Arab States (Saudi Arabia \/ UAE \/ Egypt), Seeking a Foothold:<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Presumably, these states view the Turkish rise as a threat to their regional influence, yet they remain governed by ideas of utilizing Turkey as a temporary counterweight to Iran. However, if these states reassess and realize that Turkey&#8217;s growing role poses a long-term threat, they may be driven to strengthen alliances with Israel (normalization) and the U.S., or conversely, attempt to appease Turkey through silence regarding its expanding role or by forging economic deals.<\/p>\n<p><strong>VI \u2013 Potential Strategic Scenarios<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Scenario of Successful Hegemony (Probability: Medium \u2013 Low):<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Turkey succeeds in solidifying its role as the &#8220;Indispensable Mediator,&#8221; negotiating from a position of strength for a new regional deal with Washington and Moscow (incorporating settlements in Syria, security arrangements with Israel, and energy projects). In this scenario, the &#8220;remnants of the Axis&#8221; transform into a Sunni\/Nationalist pressure force serving Turkish interests.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Scenario of Strained Management (Probability: High):<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Turkey continues its complex management but within a state of permanent tension: intermittent clashes with the Kurds, Western economic pressure, and skirmishes between its proxies and Israel. The region remains in a state of &#8220;sustainable instability&#8221;\u2014neither total war nor total peace\u2014a middle ground that may ultimately serve Ankara&#8217;s objectives.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Scenario of Collision and Retrenchment (Probability: Medium):<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The strategy collapses due to an internal Turkish crisis (economic\/political), a major incident with Israel (uncalculated involvement against Israeli interests), or the imposition of severe Western sanctions. This could lead to direct confrontations or a sudden Turkish withdrawal from managing the file, resulting in a relative or temporary power vacuum.<\/p>\n<p><strong>VII \u2013 Strategic Recommendations<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Recommendations for (The Gulf States, Greece):<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Activate the &#8220;Economic Front&#8221;: Counter Turkey by accelerating Eastern Mediterranean gas projects and maintaining its exclusion from them.<\/li>\n<li>Attract Syrian Minorities: Engage Kurds, Alawites, Druze, Christians, and moderate Sunnis to serve as a human and political buffer against Turkish expansion. This should be supported by providing clear security conditions and guarantees.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Recommendations for International Powers (USA\/EU):<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Employ &#8220;Dual Leverage&#8221;: Offer attractive economic and geopolitical cooperation frameworks (regarding migration, trade, and energy) as a &#8220;carrot,&#8221; while maintaining the threat of severe sanctions related to human rights files and militia support as a &#8220;stick.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li>Strategic Decoupling: Maintain a clear distinction between cooperation with Turkey within NATO and the evaluation of its regional policies, while establishing firm &#8220;red lines&#8221; regarding its actions in Syria and Lebanon.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Recommendations for Monitoring and Early Warning:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Monitor Turkish Internal Indicators: Track inflation rates, public opinion polls, and elite discourse as primary metrics for the resilience of the strategy.<\/li>\n<li>Track Iranian Discourse Shifts: Monitor any transition in Iranian rhetoric from &#8220;partnership&#8221; to &#8220;competition&#8221; over proxies within Syria, as this would signal the beginning of the collapse of the &#8220;alliance of necessity.&#8221;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Final Note:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The new Turkish strategy represents a bold, and perhaps desperate, attempt to transform internal weakness and regional vacuums into geopolitical power. It is a high-stakes game played on the edge of an abyss: balancing internal tensions and fractures on one side against potential collisions with international powers on the other.<\/p>\n<p>The success of this strategy depends not only on Ankara&#8217;s diplomatic performance but also on the mistakes of its adversaries and its ability to transform &#8220;managed chaos&#8221; into a &#8220;new order&#8221; that is\u2014at least temporarily\u2014acceptable to the major global powers.<\/p>\n<p>The coming phase will serve as a critical test for the stability of this fragile model of &#8220;Flexible Hegemony.&#8221;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Turkish Studies Unit Driven by internal crises and regional vacuums, Turkey is moving toward adopting a strategy of &#8220;Flexible Hegemony&#8221;in the Middle East. Its goal is no longer regime change through direct intervention, but rather transforming into an indispensable &#8220;mediating and administrative power.&#8221; This strategy relies on containing and repurposing the tools of eroding [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3557,"featured_media":14263,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[724,28,32,40,36,964],"ppma_author":[76],"class_list":["post-14262","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-israel","tag-nato","tag-russia","tag-syria","tag-turkey","tag-united-states"],"authors":[{"term_id":76,"user_id":1,"is_guest":0,"slug":null,"display_name":"admin","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/1200px-Roj_emblem.svg.png","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/1200px-Roj_emblem.svg.png"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14262","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3557"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14262"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14262\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14265,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14262\/revisions\/14265"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14263"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14262"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14262"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14262"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=14262"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}