{"id":14232,"date":"2025-12-13T21:15:40","date_gmt":"2025-12-13T20:15:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/?p=14232"},"modified":"2025-12-13T21:15:40","modified_gmt":"2025-12-13T20:15:40","slug":"why-is-the-damascus-authority-evading-the-implementation-of-the-march-10-agreement","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/why-is-the-damascus-authority-evading-the-implementation-of-the-march-10-agreement\/","title":{"rendered":"Why is the Damascus Authority Evading the Implementation of the March 10 Agreement?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The March 10 Agreement, signed between the interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi, is a pivotal political agreement that obligates the new government in Damascus to take transitional steps leading to power-sharing and fair representation for all Syrians, ensuring the rights of the Kurdish component and other components within a constitutional recognition, security and administrative reform, integration of the Self-Administration&#8217;s civil and military institutions into the Syrian state, the return of displaced persons, empowerment of local councils, and participation based on merit regardless of sectarian or ethnic affiliation.<\/p>\n<p>However, what is currently happening is that the new authority is procrastinating in implementing the clauses of this agreement, and there are no signs on the horizon of a genuine intention on their part to fully commit to the aforementioned agreement. On the contrary, it seems they only want to gain time through this agreement to rearrange the balance of power and consolidate their influence.<\/p>\n<p>Perhaps one of the reasons preventing this authority from fulfilling its responsibilities regarding the March 10 Agreement is its apprehension towards power-sharing and building a participatory, democratic system of governance, due to a set of outcomes that, overall, would not be in its favor, namely:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The participation of influential political and societal forces in governance.<\/li>\n<li>The reduction of the influence of the networks of interests surrounding the current governing regime.<\/li>\n<li>The subjection of security and judicial institutions to independent oversight.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Furthermore, there are various other concerns that plague the current authorities if the agreement is implemented:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Fear of Accountability and Justice: The implementation of the agreement may subsequently require the exposure of corruption files, the opening of the violations file, and the accountability of individuals in power or those close to it. The achievement of these matters would withdraw the immunity from this authority and expose it to legal accountability.<\/li>\n<li>Fear of Losing Legitimacy before its Base: Hastening the implementation of the agreement&#8217;s clauses might be interpreted by the regime&#8217;s loyalists as offering major concessions under internal or external pressure, and a retreat from the usual political discourse. This means creating a gap between the authority and its public, which is what this authority fears the most at the moment, knowing well that it can never risk this direction.<\/li>\n<li>Fear of Changing the Security Equation: Since the agreement includes matters such as the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the new Syrian Army, security restructuring, and joint deployment of forces, this means the current authority will no longer monopolize the weapon. It considers this monopoly an advantage, and losing it means a direct threat to its dominance. Therefore, all it seeks currently is to gain time in the hope that regional and international circumstances will change in its favor.<\/li>\n<li>Fear that the Agreement constitutes a &#8220;First Stage&#8221; that drags them into greater concessions: That is, a first step that might open the door to new demands: a broader national conference, genuine parliamentary elections, wider powers for local councils, and stronger oversight over the government.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>These are the likely concerns and fears of the current authorities, which can be inferred from their discourse and daily practices. In contrast to attempts to evade the agreement and procrastinate in implementing its clauses, the other party must work at all levels and exert the necessary pressures for the agreement to see the light, through a comprehensive set of tools:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Creating Broad National Consensus behind the Agreement: The wider the front supporting the agreement, the more isolated the authority becomes, the less capable it is of creating an alternative narrative, and the more susceptible it is to accusations of undermining national consensus. Here, it is worth remembering that activating factors and mechanisms of internal rejection remains more important and effective than any external pressure.<\/li>\n<li>Organized Popular Pressure: Not through random protests, but through coordinated popular campaigns, such as issuing statements in the name of effective political forces, syndicates, and societal institutions, and moving through local and civil councils, in addition to giving utmost priority to media outlets and cultural elites. Any transitional authority fears organized popular anger because it directly affects its legitimacy.<\/li>\n<li>Activating Civil Society Tools: Civil society is capable of exerting pressure by monitoring the implementation of the agreement, exposing the factors and reasons for its delayed application to public opinion, and publishing periodic reports on this. This would constitute a very important pressure, as it directly relates to the issue of transparency, which any non-democratic regime hates because it undermines its ability to maneuver behind the scenes.<\/li>\n<li>Conditional International Pressure: Taking into account that not all external pressure is beneficial, the required pressure is that which is conditional on the implementation of a national agreement, based on a unifying internal decision, and not linked to interventionist agendas. Only in this manner can it contribute to restricting the movements of the current authority, which fears isolation and the loss of external support most at the present time.<\/li>\n<li>Using Time Tools Against It: Since timeframes are set for agreements concluded between parties, it is essential that the public know that the current authority in Damascus is the one procrastinating in implementing the agreement. In this way, the legitimacy of this authority will erode, political alternatives will be put forward, and its masks will fall off before both the internal and external public.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Now, in short, the cost required of the current authority in case of implementation of the agreement can be identified at three levels:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Sovereign Cost: Loss of decision-making monopoly, the entry of other actors into governance, and the possibility of a rift within the ruling bloc.<\/li>\n<li>Security and Judicial Cost: Loss of control over the authority&#8217;s apparatuses, current officials being subjected to accountability or re-screening, and the end of unannounced immunity.<\/li>\n<li>Political Cost: Recognition that the country needs a genuine partnership, a decline in the authority&#8217;s status as the &#8220;strongest party,&#8221; and a raising of the ceiling for subsequent demands from the opposition and society.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>If the internal and external balances become stronger than this authority&#8217;s ability to procrastinate, it is likely to resort to the following options:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Selective Implementation: By working to apply clauses that it does not see as a real threat to its influence and interests, in contrast to delaying those that require fundamental change in the structure of the current regime.<\/li>\n<li>Reinterpretation of the Agreement, or some of its clauses, such as their current attempts regarding the clause related to the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces.<\/li>\n<li>Negotiating amendments to mitigate the agreement&#8217;s effects on it.<\/li>\n<li>Attempting to re-engineer its influence within the new structures, should it be compelled under pressure to implement the agreement&#8217;s clauses.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>To ensure the genuine implementation of this agreement, it requires, as previously mentioned and in brief:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Creating a unified, pressuring coalition around the agreement.<\/li>\n<li>Establishing a clear, public, and monitored timeline.<\/li>\n<li>Launching studied, non-chaotic public pressure tools.<\/li>\n<li>Raising the cost of political and media procrastination.<\/li>\n<li>Not falling into the trap of sectarian polarization.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Finally, the entirety of the currently available data suggests that the Damascus authority is not intending to commit to its responsibilities regarding the March 10 Agreement. This is evident through its statements and practices on the ground, including its continuous reluctance to take the required steps that would allow the agreement to see the light. There is no doubt that it harbors dreams that the opportune moment will surely come when it can pounce on the agreement and subsequently tighten its grip over the entire Syrian geography. Therefore, it is illogical to wait for this authority to voluntarily and spontaneously start implementing the agreement. On the contrary, the other party\u2014all Syrian forces supporting the agreement who see their future and interest in it\u2014must move competently and effectively to hold the current authority accountable for the agreement and compel its implementation, far from the policy of evasion and deception<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The March 10 Agreement, signed between the interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi, is a pivotal political agreement that obligates the new government in Damascus to take transitional steps leading to power-sharing and fair representation for all Syrians, ensuring the rights of the Kurdish component [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3483,"featured_media":6438,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[1250,1031,985,937,48,725,40],"ppma_author":[1249],"class_list":["post-14232","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-10-march-agreement","tag-ahmed-al-sharaa","tag-autonomous-administration-of-northern-and-eastern-syria","tag-mazloum-abdi","tag-rojava","tag-sdf","tag-syria"],"authors":[{"term_id":1249,"user_id":3483,"is_guest":0,"slug":"riad-darar","display_name":"Riad Darar","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/WhatsApp-Image-2025-12-13-at-20.43.30.jpeg","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/WhatsApp-Image-2025-12-13-at-20.43.30.jpeg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14232","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3483"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14232"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14232\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14233,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14232\/revisions\/14233"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6438"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14232"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14232"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14232"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=14232"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}