{"id":14211,"date":"2025-12-04T10:02:48","date_gmt":"2025-12-04T09:02:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/?p=14211"},"modified":"2025-12-04T10:02:48","modified_gmt":"2025-12-04T09:02:48","slug":"turkeys-incapacity-to-counter-israels-foundational-doctrine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/turkeys-incapacity-to-counter-israels-foundational-doctrine\/","title":{"rendered":"Turkey&#8217;s Incapacity to Counter Israel&#8217;s Foundational Doctrine"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan, aboard the presidential plane returning from the G20 summit hosted by South Africa, found no recourse in responding to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu&#8217;s statements about &#8220;Israel stopping Turkish expansion in Syria&#8221; other than resorting to a &#8220;moral argument&#8221; regarding the war in Gaza, and pointing to Israeli violations. Consequently, he described Netanyahu as a &#8220;criminal committing crimes publicly without shame,&#8221; and then reiterated that &#8220;Turkey has no ambitions in Syria,&#8221; and that Ankara &#8220;is capable of protecting its national security.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Netanyahu had announced in a meeting of the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs (the mini-cabinet) on Thursday, November 20th, that &#8220;Israel has prevented Turkey from entering central and southern Syria.&#8221; He was quoted in radio statements as saying, &#8220;We prevented their entry into southern Syria. They wanted to enter near our borders. I said this would not happen. We also did not want them to enter central Syria at the T-4 base, and we actually bombed that airport.&#8221; Netanyahu also ruled out Turkey acquiring advanced F-35 aircraft from the United States and declared that his country would continue to adhere to the doctrine of military superiority across the region. Netanyahu&#8217;s comments came one day after he conducted a tour with prominent military leaders to advanced positions deep in southern Syria. A few hours after that field tour, an Israeli air squadron flew over Syria. Syrian local media reported that &#8220;Israeli warplanes penetrated the airspace of southern Syria, crossing from Quneitra and Mount Hermon to west of Damascus, then to Homs and Hama provinces.&#8221; Syrian television also indicated that &#8220;the air squadron belonging to the Israeli army approached the Iskenderun region (Liwa Iskenderun) in the north, penetrating areas over the western Hama countryside, and the Latakia and southern and eastern Idlib countryside.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>All these developments occurred before the qualitative escalation represented by the Israeli operation in the village of &#8220;Beit Jinn&#8221; in the Damascus countryside on November 28th. Israel stated that the operation was to arrest wanted members of the &#8220;Islamic Group,&#8221; which resulted in confrontations with residents, leading to the death of 20 people and the injury of 24 others, in addition to the injury of 6 Israeli soldiers, including an officer. Circles within the Israeli government accused the Syrian Interim Government of involvement in resisting the Israeli army patrol, noting that the elements who clashed with the Israeli soldiers were directly affiliated with the General Security. This development suggests Israel&#8217;s rejection of the entire ongoing process of &#8220;rehabilitating&#8221; and marketing the Damascus authority, and also constitutes a response to Damascus&#8217;s recent &#8220;hardline&#8221; positions by &#8220;imposing preconditions&#8221; on Tel Aviv before signing any security agreement concerning the areas the Israeli army penetrated after the fall of Bashar al-Assad&#8217;s regime. The incursion operation also shows a &#8220;change&#8221; in the Israeli approach towards the Syrian situation, which is based on further reliance on hard power and military might at the expense of communications and meetings diplomacy, and imposing a fait accompli on Damascus and its allies by force of arms.<\/p>\n<p>Returning to Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan&#8217;s comments regarding Benjamin Netanyahu&#8217;s statements, it is important to state that the Turkish theoretical response to the Israeli action, and the use of escalating terms such as &#8220;war criminal,&#8221; does not seem strange for a man like Erdo\u011fan who is accustomed to seizing opportunities and exercising his hobby of mobilization and taking positions, primarily for electoral purposes, but also to achieve and consolidate the image of the savior hero on the level of the Islamic world. Erdo\u011fan has also become accustomed to retreating many steps when sensing the danger of a collision with a greater regional power. Erdo\u011fan&#8217;s remarks here do not fall outside the two aforementioned frameworks. He practically tried to approach the Israeli red lines by attempting to establish and qualify military bases in the Syrian interior (Hama and Homs), and he received a direct practical response from Tel Aviv in the form of Israeli aerial bombardment that destroyed everything that had been built. Israel views Syria as the arena of friction and potential confrontation between it and Turkey, and it will not allow Turkey to seize Syria and replace Iran. Consequently, it is dissatisfied with the &#8220;godfather&#8221; role that Ankara plays in building and training the &#8220;New Syrian Army,&#8221; in addition to its marketing of the Ahmad al-Sharaa authority (Hay&#8217;at Tahrir al-Sham) with its jihadist background\u2014Arabically, Islamically, and Westernly. Erdo\u011fan&#8217;s intervention with important actors to present this authority as an ally capable of playing a positive role, under Turkish sponsorship and care, actually led to some &#8220;achievement&#8221; and the emergence of &#8220;agreements between Moscow and Damascus about bringing Russian forces to the southern areas adjacent to Israel,&#8221; as well as the meeting of the interim Syrian president with the US President in Washington, and the marketing that took place there which, in Netanyahu&#8217;s words, &#8220;made al-Sharaa return inflated from Washington.&#8221; As an initial reaction, Israel announced that negotiations with the Damascus authority had reached a dead end, and that it would not withdraw from the positions it occupied after December 8, 2024, and would maintain its military presence on the peak of Mount Hermon and the buffer zone in the Golan.<\/p>\n<p>The features of the Turkish-Israeli collision appeared following the Israeli war against the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip, which resulted in the killing of tens of thousands of civilians, internal displacement, and a suffocating siege. Turkey wanted to lead the &#8220;Islamic rejection front&#8221; against Israel, but the underlying reason was its fear of the Israeli change\/founding project that has begun to loom on the horizon with the Hebrew state (Israel) engaging in confrontation on several fronts (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Yemen), and the continuous talk about changing the maps in the region and forming a &#8220;New Middle East.&#8221; Turkey understood the manifestations of Israeli power, which were represented by striking the Hamas movement and invading the Gaza Strip, inflicting devastating blows on Hezbollah in Lebanon and liquidating its first and second-tier leaders, then destroying the former Syrian regime army, striking the capabilities of the Houthis, and finally the wide-ranging attack on Iran, accompanied by the destruction of its nuclear program, the assassination of its scientists and researchers, and the liquidation of first-tier leaders in the army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Ankara felt that the Israeli fire was getting closer to it, and the question clearly arose: What if Israel, with the power it possesses, attacked Turkey? Turkey, ruled by an Islamist-Nationalist alliance and aspiring to leadership and the consolidation of the &#8220;Turkish Century,&#8221; has announced its regional expansionist projects in recent years, which secure influence and presence in the region and the world (Neo-Ottomanism, Blue Homeland, National Pact&#8230; etc.). However, it is now on the verge of collision with Israel, which is run by a right-wing government that believes that hard power and military might are the only valid language for dialogue in a region teeming with those who reject and are angry with Israel. This government explicitly declares that its future strategy is to prevent the emergence of a military force capable of threatening Israel, and that it is necessary to &#8220;change the maps&#8221; and &#8220;re-draw and reshape the region&#8221; to ensure Tel Aviv remains superior and unique in this superiority. The Israeli strike in April 2025 on ground and air bases inside Syria, which Ankara was planning to qualify and position itself in as part of the cooperation agreement with the new Damascus authority, came as a clear message and a reminder of the Israeli red lines.<\/p>\n<p>In January 2025, a report was issued in Israel by a committee called the &#8220;Committee for Examining the Security Budget and Force Buildup,&#8221; known as the &#8220;Nagel Committee,&#8221; after its head, Yaakov Nagel, the former head of the National Security Council. It recommended that the Israeli government prepare for a potential war with Turkey, and focused on the dangers of Turkish influence in Syria and the alliance between Ankara and the new authority in Damascus. Although the report referred to the Syrian arena as the source of danger and that it could turn into a field of confrontation between Turkey and Israel. Israeli fears, in reality, go beyond the local Syrian situation and stem from Turkish ambitions in the region as a whole, the military interventions in Syria and the region, the raising of the banner of large-scale expansionist projects, the building of militias, and the adoption of a religious and sectarian leadership discourse that incites against Israel. Because of these fears, the &#8220;Nagel Committee&#8221; included Turkey at the top of the parties posing a threat to Israel when it pointed to potential conflict areas that Israel will face in the foreseeable future. The committee had proposed, after a comprehensive assessment of Israel&#8217;s situation, the balance of power and influence, and the nature of alliances in the region, increasing the military budget by nearly $4.1 billion annually to modernize the Israeli military machine and expand in the fields of intelligence and electronic warfare, so that leadership and superiority always belong to the Israeli army. (See: Tariq Hamo: Changing Maps.. An Israeli Project that Confuses Turkey and Iran&#8217;s Calculations. The Kurdish Center for Studies, July 27, 2025).<\/p>\n<p>The fact is that Turkey is incapable of confronting and matching Israel in Syria and the region in general. Israel is blocking all avenues for it and has actually begun to use hard power in dealing with the Turkish expansionist ambition in the &#8220;New Syria,&#8221; including destroying the sites and bases that Ankara intends to build and concentrate in. While Tel Aviv prevents any Turkish approach to the internal and southern regions of Syria, it sends warplanes to fly and maneuver in the far north of Syria, specifically near the Iskenderun region. Further reinforcing the hostile stance and state of rejection, the Israeli government had prevented any Turkish military participation in the international force tasked with maintaining stability in Gaza. While sources speak of intentions harbored by Benjamin Netanyahu (who is preparing to enter elections in which he has no way to survive except by strengthening his alliance with right-wing forces and settler lobbies, in addition to his desire to remain an elected leader leading the stage, thereby escaping the ghost of prosecution by the International Criminal Court), to launch new attacks (and wars) on several axes and fronts hostile to Israel (Iran, Yemen, and perhaps Iraq), and to continue to strike and dismantle both Hezbollah (recently the assassination of the prominent military leader Haitham Tabtabai) and Hamas (liquidation of field military commanders, and arrest of the movement&#8217;s militants entrenched in the tunnels), there are real Turkish fears that any new widespread war in the region will lead to a change in balances and a re-drawing of the map of power, and perhaps the dismantling of some countries, especially Iran, and the emergence of a new reality that could affect the Turkish role and weaken Turkey&#8217;s strategic influence and presence in the region.<\/p>\n<p>It is clear that the Israeli army doctrine places Turkey at the head of the threats, and the increase in the military spending budget and the guarantee of technological superiority are only for containing and confronting Turkey, in addition to Iran, of course, which through the 12-day war (the first bout between Israel and the Islamic Republic) proved to be largely penetrated and completely exposed to the might of the Israeli military machine. The Israeli position on Turkey dates back to the new founding doctrine after October 7, 2023, and the strategic decision not to allow Ankara to replace Iran, whether in Syria by rehabilitating the New Syrian Army, or by sponsoring regional armed organizations hostile to Israel, which Turkey wants to be the &#8220;front line of defense&#8221; against Israel. It is most likely that the next phase will witness greater Israeli-Turkish competition, which will go beyond Tel Aviv&#8217;s attempt to constrain Ankara by pressing Washington and others to prevent the delivery of modern weapons to Turkey (F-35 aircraft), and to consolidate military alliances with Turkey&#8217;s opponents and competitors in the region (Greece and Cyprus), and to impose a field reality in Syria through the use of hard power, and to proceed with &#8220;thwarting&#8221;Turkish plans aimed at expanding influence and consolidating presence, by continuing to strike and weaken armed movements and groups, in addition to keeping options open against the Iranian regime (whose importance to Turkey Israel now understands), including the option of overthrowing this regime, and the subsequent repercussions such as the disintegration and scattering of the current Iranian geography into ethnic regions and territories, a scenario that constitutes an existential nightmare for Turkey.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan, aboard the presidential plane returning from the G20 summit hosted by South Africa, found no recourse in responding to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu&#8217;s statements about &#8220;Israel stopping Turkish expansion in Syria&#8221; other than resorting to a &#8220;moral argument&#8221; regarding the war in Gaza, and pointing to Israeli violations. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1249,"featured_media":14212,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[726,723,724,722,102,40,36],"ppma_author":[904],"class_list":["post-14211","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-gaza","tag-hamas","tag-israel","tag-palestine","tag-recep-tayyip-erdogan","tag-syria","tag-turkey"],"authors":[{"term_id":904,"user_id":1249,"is_guest":0,"slug":"tariq-hamo","display_name":"Tariq Hemo","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/Tariq-Hamo-2.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/Tariq-Hamo-2.jpg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14211","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1249"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14211"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14211\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14213,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14211\/revisions\/14213"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14212"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14211"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14211"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14211"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=14211"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}